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SOLICITOR-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AN
LITIGATION PRIVILEGE IN CIVIL LITIGATION
Garry D. Watson, Q.C.* and Frank Au**
Toronto
This paper examines the nature and scope of solicitor-client privilege and
litigation privilege . Contrary to a recent article suggesting that there are no real
differences between them, it is argued that the two privileges are distinct in terms
ofboth their underlyingpurposes and the requisite conditions to invoke them. Most
importantly, confidentiality is a requirement ofsolicitor-client privilege but not of
litigation privilege .
Moreover, extending solicitor-client privilege to communications from third
parties (asproposed in the recent article) would be dangerous . Itwould stretch the
scope of thatprivilege beyond itsjustification ofnecessity, and open the way for
lawyers to develop and offer a "new product line" : namely, confidentiality .
Whatever third party communications a client desires to keep secret could
conveniently be clothed with privilege simply by having lawyers act as a conduit
for such communications and asking themfor theirlegal opinion thereon (as itnow
appears the tobacco industry has been doing for some time with research data) . A
strongpolicy reasonfor confining solicitor-clientprivilege to direct communications
between lawyer and client is to limit the potential abuse of the privilege . Further,
since the assertion ofprivilege inevitably impedes the truthfinding process, the
public interest is best served by confining the scope of solicitor-client privilege
within narrow limits . For the same reason, the concept of "agents" must be
accorded a narrow meaning in the context ofsolicitor-client privilege, so as not
to render "agency" a back-door through which third party communications
attract solicitor-client privilege .
Cet article examine la nature et la port e du secret professionnel avocat-client et
en matière de litige. Un article r cent sugg re qu aucune diff rente r elle n existe
entre ces deux types de secret professionnel. Toutefois, cet article explique qu il s
agit de deux types distincts quant leursfins et quant aux conditions requises pour
les invoquer. Plus important encore, la confidentialit est une exigence du secret
professionnel avocat-client mais non du secretprofessionnel concernant un litige .
De plus, étendre le secret professionnel avocat-client aux communications
impliquant une tierce personne, tel que proposé dans un article r cent, serait
dangereux et en étendrait laport e au-del de sajustification de nécessité. Ce serait
ouvrir la porte au développement et à l'offre d'un nouveau'uproduit» par les
avocats : la confidentialité . Si un client désire assurer la confidentialité d'une
communication avec un tiers, il lui suffit de la faire passer par l'avocat et de
demanderà celui-ci une opinion à son sujet (une stratégie que l'industrie du tabac
* GarryD. Watson,Q.C ., of OsgoodeHall Law School, YorkUniversity, Toronto, Ontario.
** Frank An, of Toronto, Ontario .
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semble avoirsuiviepourdes données derecherchesscientifiques) . Limiter les abus
potentiels du secret professionnel est un solide motifdepolitique pour restreindre
le secretprofessionnel avocat-client aux communications directes entre ces deux
derniers. Puisque 1 affirmation du secretprofessionnel entrave in vitablement le
processus de recherche de la v rit, 1 int rêtpublic est mieux servi en limitant laport
e du secretprofessionnel 1 int rieur de limites restreintes . Pour la même raison, le
concept demandataire doit recevoirune interprétation restrictive dans le cadredu
secret professionnel avocat-client defaçon ce que le mandat ne devienne pas une
porte de demi re par laquelle les communications qui impliquent des tierces
personnes soient incluses dans le secret professionnel avocat-client.
Introduction . ... .. . .. ... ..... ... ... .. ... ... .. . .. ... ..... ... . .. ........ ... ... .. ... ... .. . .. .. . .. ... ... .. . .. ...316
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(iii) Sources ofConfusion ...... ... ........ ... ... ........ ........ ........ ... .. ...... ... .333
(iv) Contemporary Confusion ... .. ... ... ... ... .......... ... ... ........ .. . .. ... ...... .336
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Agents and Third Parties Distinguished .. ........ ... ..... ........ ... ........ ... . 346
Conclusion . . . . ... ..... ... ... ........ ... .. ... ........ ... ........ ... ... ........ ..... ... ........ ..... ... ... ... . 350
Introduction
It is well established law that while solicitor-clientprivilege protects confidential
communications passing between client and lawyer for the purpose ofobtaining
legal advice, it does not extend to nor protect communications between third
parties and the lawyer (e.g. expert reports obtained by the lawyer to assist in
providing legal advice to the client) . By contrast, the related but distinct
litigation privilege protects materials brought into existence for the dominant
purpose of pending or anticipated litigation, and applies principally to
communications received from third parties (e.g. expert reports) .1 This "twopronged approach to privilege" is challenged by J. Douglas Wilson in an article
recently published in this journal .' Wilson is concerned that the courts have
failed to include communications between solicitor and client as part of
solicitor-client privilege, and he wants this to be changed. Specifically, he
I See the analysis, below, Part IV: Solicitor-Client Privilege and Litigation Privilege
Distinguished .
2 J.D. Wilson, "Privilege in Experts' Working Papers" (1997) 76 Can. Bar Rev . 346
at 368 .
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argues that the leading case of Wheeler v . Le Marchant3 (which held that
communications between lawyers and third parties are privileged only if they
have "come into existence after litigation commenced or in contemplation")
was decided in error4 and hence "the courts and commentators have erred for
over 100 years" .5 Wilson proposes that the result of Wheeler be- rectified by
enlarging the scope of solicitor-client privilege to cover third party
communications whether or not the context is litigious .6

At first blush Wilson's proposal may seem attractive . After all, if a
corporate lawyer needs the input of an expert in order to advise the client, why
should she be in any different position to her litigation colleague down the hall
who retains an expert for the purpose of conducting the client's litigation? The
answer is that for sound policy reasons the common law has chosen not to
venture onthis course . This consideration does not inhibit Wilson, andhe would
have the courts take the major step he suggests, despite the absence of cogent
reasons as to why they should.
Instead ofexploring why the courts have refrained from extending privilege
as he proposes, Wilson simply asserts that since we grant privilege to
communications between solicitor and client in order to facilitate the giving of
legal advice, then because the giving of advice may require communications
with third persons, those communications should also be protected by the
privilege . Rather than grappling with the policy implications of the radical
change inthe law he favours,7 Wilson relies upon the aberrant statements in the
British Columbia case of Hodgkinson v . Simms, 8 and two Supreme Court of
3 (1881), 17 Ch. D. 675 (C .A .) [hereinafter Wheeler] (in an action for specific
performance of an agreement under which the defendants were to grant a lease of certain
land to the plaintiff, the defendants objected to producing a report from an estate agent/
surveyor which related to the property that was the subject of the action, but which had
come about prior to the action being contemplated, to enable the solicitors to advise the
defendants with regard to a different matter. The English Court of Appeal held that
documents received by a lawyer fromthird parties are privileged "where they have come
into existence after litigation commenced or in contemplation, and when they have been
made with a view to such litigation"; but "communications between a solicitor and a third
party in the course of his advising his client" are not as such protected).
4 Wilson, supra note 2 at 363-64 : "the court in Wheeler wrongly assumed thata client
would not fear disclosure of third person communications in the non-litigious context
simply because litigation was not contemplated" .
5 Ibid. at 349 .
6 Ibid. at 368 . See also 350, where Wilson set out in three propositions what he
considers the law should be pertaining to experts' working papers.
7 Wilson finds thepresent law inconvenient in advising clients, particularly thosewho
use survey research; he keeps referring to the fact that his proposed new regime should
extend to this relatively rare example of third party communications by solicitors; see e.g.
supra note 2 at 349, 357, 376 and 380 .
8 (1988), 33 B .C.L.R. (2d) 129 (C .A.) [hereinafter Hodgkinson] (photocopies of
unprivileged documents, collected with a lawyer's expertise for the dominant purpose of
litigation, are protected by an "all-embracing privilege" so that the client may speak in
confidence to, and receive advice from, the solicitor).
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Canada decisions9 (which reaffirmed the important role of the solicitor-client
privilege, but had nothing to do with third party communications with lawyers)
as justifying his position. However, the law of privilege is more subtle, more
reasoned and more sensitive to the underlying policy concerns than Wilson is
prepared to acknowledge .
Part I of this article summarizes Wilson's arguments . Part II analyses his
proposal for the extension of privilege, as it must be, in terms of the public
interest and we argue that there are strong policy reasons against the proposal.
Part III argues that Wilson misinterprets the two Supreme Court decisions .
PartIV, by farthe longest section ofthis article, reviews the law on solicitorclient privilege and litigation privilege . We disagree with Wilson's contention
that litigation privilege is "just a convenient name for solicitor-client privilege
when the lawyer's advice relates to litigation" . 10 In fact, the two privileges rest
on different principles and this is now recognized in both academic writings and
judicial decisions in common law jurisprudence around the world. Despite this
general recognition, the subject has not been free from confusion and the
distinction is not always well understood by practitioners; therefore we seek to
provide a broader analysis of litigation privilege . We also raise the issue of
whether the courts should more openly treat litigation privilege as being a
qualified one as have the courts in the United States . Part V explores the
somewhat murky area of third parties versus agents and we criticize a recent
Ontario Divisional Court decision which, if followed, could "run a truck
through" the carefully crafted current law by permitting clients to appoint third
parties as their agents so as to attract solicitor-client privilege for third party
communications .
I. Wilson's Argument
At the heart of Wilson's thesis is his questionable contention that there are "no
real differences between litigation privilege and solicitor-client privilege" . 11
He concedes there is a widely acknowledged distinction between the two
privileges, 12 yet he dismisses the distinction as "unnecessary,, . 13 Wilson argues
that since the English Court of Appeal erred in Wheeler, the "two-pronged
approach to privilege" set out in subsequent cases (most significantly, Susan
Hosiery Ltd. v. M.N.R . 14) should not be followed because of their reliance on
9 Solosly and Descoteaux, cited and discussed infra notes 19 and 20.
10 Wilson, supra note 2 at 359 .
11
Ibid. at 371 .
12 Ibid. at 367 .
13 Ibid. at 368
.
14 [196912 Ex. C.R. 27 [hereinafter Susan Hosiery] (communications between a
solicitor and anaccountantacting as the appellant company's representative are privileged ;
there is adistinction between (1) confidential communications between a client and alegal
adviser forthe purpose ofobtaining legal advice, and (2) materials prepared forthe lawyer's
brieffor existing or contemplated litigation) .
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Wheeler. 15According to him, the argumentthatlitigationprivilege and solicitorclientprivilege are grounded in different rationales isnothing more than expost
facto rationalization. 16
Wilson suggests, moreover, that since litigation privilege is a "species" of
the solicitor-client privilege, it should be "treated as an absolute privilege,, ; 17
and that solicitor-client privilege should be extended to cover third-parry
communications regardless of any litigationcontext. According to Wilson, itis
"evident" that this was the intent of the Supreme Court of Canada, 18 expressed
in the cases of Solosky v. Canada 19 and Descoteaux v. Mierzwinski .20 In this
connection, Wilson criticizes the UnitedStates analog ofthe litigationprivilege,
the "work product" doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Hickman v. Taylor,21 as being a "truncated" privilege 22 Solicitorclient privilege, Wilson urges, is a "fundamental and absolute right of the
client", and it outweighs any public policy considerations such as "the fair
disposition of litigation" .23
II. Examining Wilson's Proposal in Light ofthe Public Interest
(i) The Impact ofPrivilege
IfWilson's proposal is adopted, the scope ofsolicitor-client privilege as we
know it will be drastically expanded, and the scope of discovery significantly
reduced . The result would be a radical re-calibration of the delicate balance
is Wilson, supra note 2 at 368 .
16 Ibid . at 372. On this point, see infra note 87 and accompanying text.
17 Ibid . at 371 .
is Ibid .
19 [1980] 1 S.C .R. 821 [hereinafter Solosky] (solicitor-client privilege is "no longer
regarded merely as a rule ofevidence", ithas been elevated to a"fundamentalcivil andlegal
right" ; yet it didnot override the need to censorprisoners' mail, "the scale must ultimately
come down in favour of the public interest").
20 [1982] 1 S.C
.R. 860 [hereinafter Descoteaux] (the right to confidentiality is now
recognized as having a "much broader scope" than as a rule of evidence; solicitor-client
privilege applies to confidential communications made to the lawyer or his employees,
whether ofan administrative nature orrelating tothe actual legal problem, evenbefore the
retainer isperfected ; butitdoesnotextend tocommunications intendedtofurther acriminal
purpose) .
21 329 U.S.495 (1946) [hereinafterHickman] (witness statementssecuredinanticipation
oflitigation are not protected by solicitor-client privilege; nonetheless, they are subject to
aqualified immunity from discovery which only ashowing of"goodcause" may override,
i.e. thepartyseeking discoveryhas substantial need ofthe materials and is unable to obtain
same without undue hardship) . The work product doctrine, now codified in Rule 26(b)(3)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, protects "materials prepared in anticipation of
litigation orfor trial" includingdocuments and othermaterials revealing a lawyer's mental
processes (i.e.impressions, conclusions, opinions, orlegal theories), seeE.S. Epstein et al.,
The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work-Product Doctrine (Chicago: ABA press,
1983) at 62.
22 Wilson, supra note 2 at
372 .
23 Ibid . at 370.
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between privilege anddiscovery, yet the question ofwhether such aresultwould
be in the public interest is barely touched on by Wilson. He asserts, simply, that
"the fundamental right of an individual to a full and frank communication with
his legal adviser outweighs such public policy considerations and justifies the
absolutism of the privilege" .24
What Wilson has overlooked is the impact ofprivilege . The effect of a rule
of privilege, which permits a party to conceal relevant information from the
other party and the court, is that it may shut out the truth. This hindrance on the
search for the truth can be justified only on the grounds that more important
interests need to be preserved . As it is explained in McCormick on Evidence :
Rules which serveto renderaccurate ascertainment ofthe truth more difficult, or
in some instances impossible, may seem anomalous in a rational system of factfinding . Nevertheless, rules of privilege are not without a rationale . Their warrant is
the protection ofinterests and relationships which, rightly or wrongly, are regarded as
of sufficient social importance to justify some sacrifice of availability of evidence
relevant to the administration ofjustice .25
Forpresent purposes, it is sufficient to note that solicitor-client privilege has as
its theoretical basis26 "the public interest in having citizens able to obtain legal
Ibid.
225 J.W. Strong, ed., McCormick on Evidence, 4th ed., vol . 1 (St. Paul: West, 1992) at
24

269 .

For a critique of solicitor-client privilege see infra note 54. For a detailed account
of the theoretical basis of the privilege, see A. Paizes, "Towards a Broader Balancing of
Interests : Exploring the Theoretical Foundations of Legal Professional Privilege" (1989)
106 SouthAfrican L.J. 109,which includes an extensive review ofthe theoretical literature.
Major writings referred to (with Paizes' characterization of their essential views on
privilege in parenthesis) include the following:
J.H. Wigmore,A Treatise on theAnglo-American System ofEvidence in Trials atCommon
Law, 3d ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1940) at §2292 ("`it is nonetheless an obstacle to the
investigation ofthe truth' and `ought to be strictly confined within the narrowest possible
limits consistent with the logic of its principle"') ;
J.A. Gardner, "A Re-evaluation of the Attorney-client Privilege" (1963) 8 Villanova L.R.
279 and 447 ("a champion of procedural justice, an agent of the due process of law .. . a
bastion of human dignity") ;
D.W. Louisell, "Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion : Privileges in Federal Court
Today" (1956) 31 Tulane L.R. 101 ("an expression of the mores and ethos of Western
society") ;
E.M. Morgan, "Foreword" in Model Code ofEvidence (Philadelphia : American Law
Institute, 1942), "Suggested Remedy for Obstructions to Expert Testimony by Rules of
Evidence" (1943)10 U. Chicago L.R. 285, "Some Observations Concerning a ModelCode
of Evidence" (1940) 89 U. Pa. L.R. 145 ("an unconscionable barrier to the truth") ;
M.E. Frankel, "The Search for Truth Continued : More Disclosure, Less Privilege" (1982)
54U. Colorado L.R. 51 ("the product ofa naively romantic understanding ofthe role ofthe
lawyer") ;
M.E. Frankel, Partisan Justice (New York: Hill and Wang, 1980) ("a mandate to legal
practitioners to apply partisan justice") ; and
"Developments in the Law -Privileged Communications" (1985) 98 Harvard L.R. 1450
("a political device for according special protection to a favoured elite").
26

1998]

Solicitor-Client Privilege and Litigation Privilege in Civil Litigation

32 1

advice, without fear that their confidences may thereafter be disclosed to their
detriment" .27 Wilson is content to rest his case by reiterating this classic
rationale (which properly justifies the privilege for communications between
lawyer and client, butnot thirdparty communications), withoutfurtherexploring
the implications of the much expanded solicitor-client privilege he proposes.
Wilson's complaint that there has been a "truncation of the fundamental right
to solicitor-client privilege"28 suffers, as a result, from an inadequate analysis
of the public interest .
What would be the likely impact of accepting Wilson's proposal? If
solicitor-client privilege is extended to third party communications whenever
legal advice is being sought (i.e. even when litigation is not contemplated),
many documents not currently subject to privilege would become so. For
example, in the course of giving advice, or doing transactions for clients,
lawyers frequentlyreceive communications from thirdparties . These willrange
all the way from the survey report the solicitor received in Wheeler in order to
carry out a real estate transaction, to the multitude of documents received by
solicitors today from third parties (e.g. investment bankers, accountants,
engineers, environmental experts, etc.) in carrying out a corporate acquisition
or a securities transaction. The impact ofWilson's proposal on litigation arising
from such transactions would be enormous and startling.
Equally (or more) disturbing is that the proposal opens the way for lawyers
to develop and offer a "new productline": namely, confidentiality .29 Whatever
communications by thirdparties aclient desires to keep secretmayconveniently
be clothed with privilege simply by having lawyers act as a conduit for such
communication and asking them for their legal opinion th6reon.30 A strong
policy reason for confining solicitor-client privilege to direct communications
between lawyer and client is to limit the potential abuse of the privilege. As
Professor Geoffrey Hazard has observed, solicitor-client privilege is often a
device for covering-up "legally dubious or dirtybusiness" ;31 and it now appears
27 P.Y. Atkinson, "Production Obligations: the Narrowed Scope of the Work Product
Privilege" (1994) vol. 13 : issue 2 Advocates' Soc. J. 6 at 6. For moreextensive statements of
the rationale, see J.D. Heydon, "Legal Professional Privilege and Third Parties" (1974) 37
Modern L. Rev. 601 at 605-607 and S.N. Lederman, "Discovery-Production ofDocumentsClaim of Privilege to Prevent Disclosure" (1976) 54 Can. Bar Rev. 422 at 423-24.
28 Wilson, supra note 2 at 356.
29 "Newproductline forlawyers" is aphrasecoinedby Charles Nesson, ofthe Harvard
Law School, who made the criticism in connection with Upjohn Co . v. United States, 449
U.S . 383 (1981) [hereinafter Upjohn] (in-house andoutside counsels were engaged by the
corporation to conduct a world-wide investigation, of the extent of bribery in which the
corporation had indulged, and the tax consequences ofthe bribes. The court held that the
information generatedby the investigationwas coveredby attorney-client privilege, on the
ground that it had been obtained from corporate employees forthepurpose oflegaladvice).
30 Whether or notintended by Wilson, this consequence is almost certain to follow his
proposal (e.g. with respect to the survey research on which Wilson put so much emphasis,
see supra note 7); see infra note 32 as tothetobaccoindustries' practicesremarketresearch .
31 G
.C. Hazard, Jr., "An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege"
(1978) 66 Calif. L. Rev . 1061 at 1062 .
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that the tobacco industry systematically used the device of routing third party
communications, including marketing and other research, through its lawyers
in an attempt to attract privilege.32 Wilson's proposal would have the effect of
not only encouraging the deliberate redirection of sensitive data through
lawyers (to attract privilege), but also bestowing this misguided blessing of
privilege upon all communications with third parties. The obstruction thus
caused to the truth-finding process is self-evident and substantial .33
Solicitor-client privilege is meant to protect only the clients' confidences,
not those of thirdparties. As Wigmore pointed out,
Since the privilege is designed to secure subjective freedom ofmind for the client in
seeking legal advice, it has no concern with otherpersons' freedom ofmind nor with
the attorney's own desire for secrecy in conduct of a client's case. It is therefore not
sufficientfor the attorney, in invoking the privilege, to state that the information came
somehow to him while acting for the client nor that it came from some particularthird
person for the benefit of the client [emphasis in original] .34
Wilson is in error, therefore, when he asserts that there "should be no difference
between communications with the client and communications with necessary
32 See
"Release of Tobacco Documents Ordered-Evidence Shows Companies Used
Lawyers to Hide Data, State Judge Says", The Wall Street Journal (9 March 1998) A3,
reporting that tobacco companies were ordered to produce 39,000 internal documents for
which privilege had been claimed . Included were documents concerning research about
nicotine addiction and brand preferences of children. Judge Kenneth Fitzpatrick of the
Minnesota District Court said"the industry's lawyers misused the attorney-clientprivilege
and deliberately misrepresented documents to hide evidence of crime and fraud from
Minnesota's lawyers" in an action by the state to recover health care costs associated with
smoking. One example cited by the judge was astudy reviewing "apparently problematic
research" conducted by "an outside marketing firm for a Canadian affiliate [of B.A.T.
Industries PLC], Imperial Tobacco Co. The research, according to the review, contained
`multiple references to how very young smokers at first believe they cannot become
addicted, only todiscoverlater, to their regret, thatthey are "'. See alsoMinnesota v. Phillip
Morris Inc ., 1998 WL 257214 (Minn. Dist. Ct., March 7, 1998) and 1998 WL 154543
(Minn. Sup . Ct., March 27, 1998).
33 A
similar criticism has been made of Upjohn, supra note 29, in the United States
(i.e . the Supreme Courtdecision has facilitated the practice of channeling communications
through corporate counsel for the purpose of attracting solicitor-client privilege), see e.g.
R.G. Nath, "Lipjohn : a New Prescription for the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work
Product Defenses inAdministrative Investigations" (1981) 30 BuffaloL. Rev . 11. See also
R. v. McCarthy Tetrault (1992), 12 C.P.C. (3d) 42 (Ont. Prov. Div .) (an application for
solicitor-client privilege under s. 160 (8) of the Provincial Offences Act was sustained
where the judge held that the evidence (i.e . the solicitor's affidavit) established that the
purpose of an environmental audit meeting, attended by the solicitor, was to obtain legal
advice) . The Crown contended that the meeting was "conducted for internal corporate
purposes rather than an assessment of[the company's] compliance with the law", and that
the solicitor's evidence was merely a "recasting ofthe purpose of the meeting in order to
shelter the company behind a solicitor-client privilege" . Indeed, a notice circulated prior
to the meeting described the lawyer's role as "serving as the recorder and keeper of the
information developed", and made no reference to any intended provision of legal advice .
34 J.H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Lax, McNaughton Rev ., vol. 8
(Boston : Little, Brown, 1961) at 619 .
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third persons".35 While the purpose of solicitor-client privilege is to enable the
client to speak candidly to alawyer, thirdparty communications "scarcely touch
upon the state of mind of the client in consulting the lawyer". 36 In short, both
policy and analytical considerations oppose Wilson's proposal .
(ii) The Necessity of Balancing Competing Interests

Wilson argues that it isunnecessary to consider other competinginterests,
given the "broader concept of solicitor-client privilege' ,38 recognized by the
Supreme Court of Canada in Solosky and Descoteaux. The reply to this is that
his reading of these two cases is open to serious question, as will be shown
below. Moreover, even this "broader concept" by no means excludes a
consideration of other aspects of the public interest. After all, solicitor-client
privilege was denied to the claimants in both Solosky and Descoteaux, because
it would be contrary to the public interest to extend the scope of privilege to
cover the circumstances in those two cases. In Solosky (which concerned the
right of an inmate to communicate in confidence with his solicitor), Dickson J.
(as he then was) observed that :
the Court is placed in the position of having to balance the public interest in
maintainingthe safety and security ofapenalinstitution, its staff and its inmates, with
theinterest represented by insulating the solicitor-client relationship . Even giving full
recognition to the right of an inmate to correspond freely with his legal adviser, and
the need for minimum derogation therefrom, the scale must ultimately come down in
favour of the public interest [emphasis added] . 39

In Descoteaux, communications made by a legal aid applicant were denied
protection of the solicitor-client privilege because false statements were
communicated with a view to criminally obtain a benefit. The Supreme Court
of Canada confirmed the long-recognized proposition of law that even
confidential communications between solicitor and client would cease to be
privileged, "ifand to the extent that they were made forthe purpose ofobtaining
legal advice to facilitate the commission of a crime" 40
Solicitor-client privilege, then, is not as "absolute" as one might suppose :
the public interest has always been a factor in the equation (as is well illustrated
by the contemporary law on waiver of privilege and recent rulings in the
criminal law context) .41 When it comes to litigation, the public interest has
Wilson, supra note 2 at 357.
N.J. Williams, "Four Questions of Privilege: the Litigation Aspect of Legal
Professional Privilege" (1990) 9 Civil Justice Q. 139 at 143 .
37 Wilson, supra note 2 at 370.
38 Solosky, supra note 19 at 836.39 Ibid. at 840 .
40 Descoteaux, supra note 20 at 881 .
41 Formajorinroads on the supposed absolute nature of solicitor-client privilege see
the modern (and fast developing) law on waiver ofthe privilege, holding that waiver may
occur not only where apartyputs in issue thelegal advice she has received, but where the
opposing party's allegations make it fair to waive the initial party's solicitor-client
35

36
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several dimensions . Making all the material evidence available through the
discovery process to the other side (and the court) is one aspect of the public
interest, and the various heads of privilege reflect another . 42 To properly
balance these competing interests, as Mr. Justice Murphy observed in Hickman,
is "a delicate and difficult task".43 Indeed, the history of the law in this area has

been an illustration of this tug-of-war between the search for truth and the
protection of the privilege, both of which occur within the context of the
administration of justice .¢¢

III. Wilson's Reading ofSolosky andDescoteaux
Throughout his essay,45 Wilson criticizes the "truncation" of privilege as being
inconsistent with the Supreme Court of Canada's recognition of solicitor-client
privilege as "a fundamental civil and legal right . 46 This argument depends on
Wilson's view that litigation privilege is just a branch of solicitor-client
privilege . Seethe case law discussed in G .D . Watson & C . Perkins, Holniested and Watson:
Ontario Civil Procedure, looseleaf vol. 3 (Toronto : Carswell, 1998) at 30 § 38 .
In the criminal law context, L'Heureux-Dubs J . observed in her concurring judgment
in R . v . Beharriell (1995), 130 D .L .R . (4th) 422 at 439 and 451 (S .C .C .), that [a]t
common law, the solicitor-client privilege as well as the informer privilege are fully
recognized. These privileges are not absolute however ; they must yield, in some
circumstances, to the accused's right to make full answer and defence. For example,
in R . v . Seaboyer (1991), 66 C .C .C . (3d) 321 at p . 388, 83 D .L.R. (4th) 193 at p. 260,
[199112 S .C .R . 577, McLachlin J., speaking for the majority of the court, held that
informer privilege and solicitor-client privilege may yield in the context of a criminal
trial if the accused's innocence is at stake . . . Even the solicitor-client privilege, which
has been elevated to a "fundamental civil and legal right" . . . will be overridden to allow
the accused to make full answer and defence to criminal charges .
InR. v. Pilgrim, [ 1997] O .J. No . 2289 (Q .L .), Abbey J. adopted this principle, i .e . "solicitorclient privilege may be required to yield to an over-riding interest of an accused in ensuring
an opportunity to make full answer and defence to a charge and in ensuring to himself a fair
trial" (ibid . at 12 on Q.L.) . Accordingly, documents and audio tapes concerning a solicitorclient interview, relevant to the defence, were ordered to be produced. See also R . v. S .S .,
[1997] O .J . No. 140 (Q .L .) (production was ordered for files from the lawyers who
represented a Crown witness in earlier family and criminal proceedings ; other persons'
right to confidentiality must be balanced against the accused's right to full answer and
defence, which was implicated by information contained in the documents) .
42 Williams, supra note 36 at 140.
43 Hickman, supra note 21 at 497 : "Examination into a person's files and records,
including those resulting from the professional activities of an attorney, must be judged
with care . It is not without reason that various safeguards have been established to preclude
unwarranted excursions into the privacy of a man's work. At the same time, public policy
supports reasonable and necessary inquiries . Properly to balance these competing interests
is a delicate and difficult task".
44 R.D. Manes, "Truth, Justice, and the Privileged Way : New Developments in the
Legal Advice and Litigation Privilege" in Civil Litigation Review (Toronto : L .S .U .C .,
1989) B-1 .
45 See e .g . Wilson, supra note 2 at 356, 365, 370-73 .
46 Soloskv, supra note 19 at 839 ; cited by Wilson, supra note 2 at 360 .
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privilege: awrong premise forthe reasons discussedbelow. In addition, Wilson's
criticism is problematic because of his mis-reading of Solosky and Descoteaux.
He claims, for instance, that "[n]o distinction is made in Solosky between
the fundamental purpose or policies grounding solicitor-client privilege and
litigation privilege"47 This is true; butit would certainly be wrong to conclude on
this basis that the distinction should not be drawn. Indeed, it is a stretch to suggest
that the Supreme Court of Canada decided a question not raised for decision and
which it did not even contemplate. In Soloslry, theissuebefore the Courtconcerned
the right of an inmate to communicate in confidence with his solicitor. There was
no discussion of thirdparty communicationor anticipation of litigation : the subject
of litigation privilege simply did not arise. Likewise in Descoteaux, the Court's
comment was directed to solicitor-client privilege. The case was concerned with
confidential statements made by a legal aid applicantregarding hisincome48In its
formulationof thesubstantive rule, the SupremeCourt of Canada made it clearthat
the rule pertains to "communications between solicitor and client"4 9 In both
Solosky and Descoteaux, litigation privilege was not even brought up as a
subject because it was irrelevant in the context of the two cases.
None of these considerations deter Wilson, however, from making broad
generalizations about litigation privilege not warranted by Solosky and
Descoteaux. The two cases, according to Wilson, "clarified the broad scope of
protection to be given to solicitor-client privilege (thus making `litigation
privilege' unnecessary)" [emphasis added] .50 Furthermore, Wilson boldly
declares that litigation privilege is "merely part of the single all-embracing
solicitor-client privilege according to the rationale in Solosky andDescoteaux
and set out clearly in Hodgkinson" [emphasis added] .51 The reference to
Hodgkinson (discussed below) is justified, but nowhere in the reasoning of
Solosky or Descoteaux was there even an allusion to a "single all-embracing"
privilege. Since the Court was not called upon to address the issue, its silence
on the distinction between litigation privilege and solicitor-client privilege was
no endorsement of any "single all-embracing" privilege.
Unless the well established distinction between litigation privilege and
solicitor-client privilege is ignored, there is no basis for Wilson's assertion that
a fundamental right has been truncated . What the Supreme Court of Canada
elevated to a "fundamental civil and legal right" was solicitor-client privilege,
47 Wilson, supra note 2 at 359 .
48 That a legal aid bureau is a lawyer's "agent" and not a "third party" is clear from

thereasons inDescoteaux, adoptedfromR . v.Littlechild (1979), 51 C.C .C . (2d) 406 (Alta.
C.A .) : "conversations with asolicitor's agents held for the purposeof retaininghim would
also be privileged, even though the solicitor was notthen, or ever, retained . In my view,the
principle protects from disclosure a conversation between an applicant forlegal aid and the
non-lawyer official of the Legal Aid Society who interviews him to see if he is qualified"
[emphasis added] (Descoteaux, supra note 20 at 880) . See the further discussion, below,
Part V: Agents and Third Parties Distinguished.
49 Descoteaux, supra note 20 at 875.
50 Wilson, supra note 2 at 369 .
51 Ibid. at 370.
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not litigation privilege .5' While the ambit oflitigationprivilege has narrowed, 53
this development is by no means inconsistent with the spirit of Solosky or
Descoteaux. As already suggested, one must keep in mind the tug-of-war
betweenthe search for truth and the protection ofprivilege . Without getting into
the motivation behind the creation ofprivileges, 54 we should note the warning
ofLord Edmund-Davies of the House of Lords, that "we should start from the
basis that the public interest is, on balance, best served by rigidly confining
within narrow limits the cases where material relevant to litigation may be
lawfully withheld . Justice is better served by candour than by suppression".55
IV. Solicitor-Client Privilege and Litigation Privilege Distinguished
(i) The Limit ofSolicitor-Client Privilege
To understand the content and policy of solicitor-client privilege and
litigation privilege, itisnecessary to keep in mind the perennial conflict between
the principle of open discovery and rules of privilege . The purpose of the
52 See e.g. Descoteaux, supra note 20 at 880 (citing R. v.Littlechild
(1979), 51 C.C.C.
(2d) 406 (Alta. C.A.)) : "The privilege protecting from disclosure communications between
solicitor and client is a fundamental right" [emphasis added] .
53 Atkinson, supra note 27 at 6: "... the work product privilege has been eroded as a
result ofthe 1985 enactment ofthe Rules ofCivil Procedure (the `newrules') [specifically,
Ontario Rule 31.06] together with the adoption, in Canada, of the dominant purpose rule
articulated bythe House ofLords in Waugh v. British RailwaysBoard" . InWaugh v.British
RailwaysBoard, [1980] A.C. 521 (H.L.) [hereinafter lVaugh], itwas heldthat privilege for
a routine incident report could not be justified unless litigation was the dominant purpose
of its preparation . This matter is discussed further, below Part IV, under the heading :
"Truncated" Nature ofLitigation Privilege.
54 Notwithstanding the lofty language concerning the
sanctity of privilege, it is
important to note who benefits directly and indirectly from it. In civil litigation the
important privileges are solicitor-client privilege,litigationprivilege, settlement negotiation
privilege, and (to a lesser extent) Crown privilege. The solicitor-client, litigation and
settlement negotiation privileges are framed in terms of being the client's privilege, but
they also have the effect ofcloaking a large amount oflawyer's work with the protection
ofprivilege . Crownprivilege, bydefinition, protects the Crown (i.e., the government) . One
does not have to be too much of a cynic to realize that those who benefit substantially from
the important privileges in civil litigation are also those who are regularly involved in the
law-making process : lawyers and the government. Compare "Developments in the LawPrivileged Communications" (1985) 98 Harvard L.R. 1450 (attorney-client privilege is a
political device for according special protection to a favoured elite). In this context it is
worth noting A.A.S. Zuckerman's observation :
Those who place legal professional privilege on the exalted and unassailable pedestal
offundamental justice may be reminded that there are other professions that provide
invaluable services, suchas medical practitioners and accountants, who seemtorender
perfectly good service to both individuals and the public without the benefit ofimmunity
from disclosing what passes between themselves and their clients ("Legal Professional
Privilege - the Cost ofAbsolutism" (1996) 112 L.Q .R. 535 at 539). Fischel goes further.
In "Lawyers and Confidentiality" (1998) 65 Univ ofChicago L. Rev . 1, Fischel denies
the legitimacy ofthe privileges being discussed here. "[A] way to askwhy encouraging
communications withthe legal profession is so important is toinquire who benefits from
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solicitor-client privilege, as stated earlier, is to encourage candour in the client
when communicating with a lawyer. 56 Without the guarantee of confidence,
candour may be inhibited and the client may as a result be unable to obtain full
and frank legal advice . ®n the other hand, this privilege must be kept within
strict limits on account of its hindrance in the search for truth, which the
discovery process is aimed to promote . The result, in the words of Jessel M.R .
in Wheeler, is that the protection afforded by the privilege will not be extended
"beyond what necessity warrants" . 57
This explains why the English Court of Appeal in Wheeler refused to extend
privilege to communications between lawyer and third party which were not
made in contemplation of litigation . Contrary to Wilson's criticism,58 Wheeler
quite reasonably held that such an extension was not necessary "in order to
enable persons freely to communicate with their solicitors and obtain their legal
advice" 59 Communications with third parties may, on occasions, be helpful to
these communications . Stated this way, the question answers itself. confidentiality
benefits lawyers because it increases the demand for legal services . The legal profession,
not clients or society as a whole, is the primary beneficiary of confidentiality rules" (Ibid.
at 3) . He concludes : "the attorney-client privilege, and the work product doctrine benefit lawyers but are of dubious value to clients and society as a whole . Absent some
more compelling justification for their existence than has been advanced to date, these
doctrines should be abolished" (Ibid. at 33)
55 Waugh, supra note 53 at 543 .
56
Anderson

See
v . Bank of British Columbia (1876), 2 Ch. D . 644 [hereinafter
Anderson], where Jessel M .R . articulated the rationale of solicitor-client privilege as
follows :
The object and meaning of the rule is this : that as, by reason of the complexity and
difficulty of our law, litigation can only be properly conducted by professional men,
it is absolutely necessary that a man, in order to prosecute his rights or to defend
himself from an improper claim, should have recourse to the assistance of professional
lawyers, and it being so absolutely necessary, it is equally necessary, to use a vulgar
phrase, that he should be able to make a clean breast of it to the gentleman whom he
consults with a view to the prosecution of his claim, or the substantiating his defence
against the claim of others; that he should be able to place unrestricted and unbounded
confidence in the professional agent, and that the communications he so makes to him
should be kept secret, unless with his consent (for it is his privilege, and not the
privilege of the confidential agent), that he should be enabled properly to conduct his
litigation . That is the meaning of the rule (ibid. at 649) .
In Anderson, the court held that a report prepared by an agent of the defendant bank,
requested by the bank without specifying its intended submission to a legal adviser, was not
privileged because the communication was not made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice .
57 Wheeler, supra note 3 at 682 . Compare Hickman, supra note 21 at 508, which stated
unequivocally that solicitor-client privilege "does not extend to information which an
attorney secures from a witness while acting for his client in anticipation of litigation . Nor
does this privilege concern the memoranda, briefs, communications and other writings
prepared by counsel for his own use in prosecuting his client's case ; and it is equally
unrelated to writings which reflect an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions
or legal theories".
5s
Wilson, supra note 2 at 363-64 .
59 Wheeler, supra note 3 at 685 .

328

THE CANADIAN BAR REVIEW

[Vol.77

facilitate the giving of legal advice, but they are far from being essential to the
solicitor-client relationship . In this sense, it is "not necessary" to extend the
privilege to third party communications, when litigation is not contemplated .
Again, it must be remembered that an extension of privilege always carries a
cost. Paradoxically, any extension of the scope of privilege beyond what
necessity requires may undermine what the privilege is supposed to promote,
namely, the administration of justice. 6 o
(ii) The Rationale ofLitigation Privilege
If the need to procure legal advice does not, of necessity, entail the
protection of communications from third parties, then why should such
communications be privileged when litigation is involved? Indeed, why should
litigation privilege (but not solicitor-client privilege) protect third party
communications and other documents created in anticipation of litigation?
The reason is that the policy justification for litigation privilege differs from
that which underlies solicitor-client privilege. Litigation privilege arises from
the nature oftrial in the common lawprocedural system : the adversary mode1 .61
What renders this privilege "necessary" is the adversary character oftrial in the
common law system, under which it is essential that both parties prepare and
pursue the evidence vigorously, In Ottawa-Carleton (Regional Municipality) v.
Consumers' Gas Co.,62 O'Leary J. relied on American sources based on
Hickman and put the matter in the following terms:
The adversarial system is based on the assumption that if each side presents its
case in the strongest light the Court will be best able to determine the truth. Counsel
must be free to make the fullest investigation and research without risking disclosure
of his opinions, strategies and conclusions to opposing counsel. The invasion ofthe
privacy of counsel's trial preparation might well lead to counsel postponing research
and other preparation until the eve ofor during the trial, so as to avoid early disclosure
of harmful information, This result would be counterproductive to the present goal
thatearly and thorough investigation by counsel will encourage an early settlement of
the case. Indeed, ifcounsel knows he must turn over to the other side the fruits of his
See the analysis, above, Part II: the Impact of Privilege.
N.J. Williams, "Discovery of Civil Litigation Trial Preparation in Canada" (1980)
58 Can. Bar Rev . 1 at 47. Despite Williams' criticism ofthe reasoning in Wheeler (ibid.
at 45), cited with approval by Wilson, supra note 2 at 364, Williams never disputed the
soundness ofthe result in thatcase (i.e. confining privilege for third party communications
to the litigious context) . Moreover, Williams clearly rejected the view(heldbyWilson) that
the protection for third party communications could be justified by the client's need to
obtain legal advice . Williamsnoted thatthirdparty communications "hardly touchupon the
state of mind ofthe client in consulting his solicitor" (Williams, ibid. at 39); accordingly,
the protection for such communications "has nothing to do with the need to encourage the
client to speak candidly to his lawyer, which is the rationale of the [solicitor-client
privilege]" (supra note 36 at 143).
62 (1990), 74O.R. (2d) 637 (Div. Ct.) [hereinafter Ottaiva-Carleton] (wherephotocopies
ofpublic documents have been obtained for the dominant purpose of use in litigation, then
the photocopies, but not the original documents, are privileged) .
60
61
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work, he may be tempted to forgo conscientiously investigating his own case in the
hope he will obtain disclosure of the research, investigations and thought processes
compiled in the trial brief of opposing counsel . See Kevin M . Claremont, "Surveying
Work Product" (1983) 68 Cornell L .R. 760, pp. 784-788 .
I agree in particular with the author's words at p . 788 :
`Serving justice by ordering discovery in one case may ultimately
hinder it by discouraging attorney preparation in later cases' 63
The important distinctions between solicitor-client privilege and litigation
privilege, and their respective rationales, have been clearly articulated by Dean
Robert Sharpe (now Mr. Justice Sharpe) :
There are, I suggest, at least three important differences between the two . First,
solicitor-client privilege applies only to confidential communications between the
client andhis solicitor . Litigationprivilege, on the other hand, applies to communications
of a non-confidential nature between the solicitor and third parties and even includes
material of a non-communicative nature . Secondly, solicitor-client privilege exists
any time a client seeks legal advice from his solicitor whether or not litigation is
involved. Litigation privilege, on the other hand, applies only in the context of
litigation itself. Thirdly, and most important, the rationale for solicitor-client privilege
is very different from that which underlies litigation privilege. This difference merits
close attention . The interest which underlies the protection accorded communications
between a client and a solicitor from disclosure is the interest of all citizens to have
full and ready access to legal advice . If an .individual cannot confide in a solicitor
knowing that what is said will not be revealed, it will be difficult, if not impossible,
for that individual to obtain proper candid legal advice .
Litigation privilege, on the other hand, is geared directly to the process of
litigation. . . . Its purpose is more particularly related to the needs of the adversarial trial
process . Litigation privilege is based upon the need for a protected area to facilitate
investigation and preparation of a case for trial by the adversarial advocate [emphasis
added]64
Given the distinct raison d'.etre of litigation privilege, it becomes self-evident
why this privilege protects only those materials brought into existence in
anticipation of litigation . It is unnecessary for litigation privilege to extend
beyond the litigious context because the need to preserve the adversary process
63 Ibid. at 643 . Similar observations had been made by the court in Hickman, supra
note 21 at 511 & 516 :
Proper preparation of a client's case demands that [a lawyer] assemble information,
sift what he considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal
theories and plan his strategy without undue and needless interference . . . Were such
[work product of the lawyer] open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much ofwhat
is now put down in writing would remain unwritten . . . But a common law trial is and
always should be an adversary proceeding. Discovery was hardly intended to enable
a learned profession to perform its functions either without wits or on wits borrowed
from the adversary .
See also Williams, supra note 61 at 46 : "A party might be discouraged from making
anything but the most cursory inquiries were he to be required to hand over unfavourable
evidence to the adversary . Also, under such a system each party might be tempted to simply
rely on the adversary to investigate the facts and then wait for discovery to get the results".
64 R.J. Sharpe, "Claiming Privilege in the Discovery Process" in Law in Transition :
Evidence, L.S .U .C. Special Lectures (Toronto : De Boo, 1984) 163 at 164-65 .
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does not arise outside this context . To answer Wilson's objection,65 it is not
"logically inconsistent" to protect only litigatiOn-related third party
communications, because the purpose ofthisprotection is foundin the litigation
process itself, not in the necessity of clients to obtain legal advice. Litigation
privilege is based, as Sharpe observed, upon the "need for a zone of privacy to
facilitate adversarial preparation" . 66
That solicitor-client privilege and litigation privilege rest on different
principles is wellestablished inboth academic writings67 andjudicial decisions .68
65 Wilson argues (supra note 2 at 363) that in order "to enable persons freely to
communicate", privilege must cover thirdparty communications in both litigious and nonlitigious contexts, and that "it is logically inconsistent to treat them differently".
66 Sharpe, supra note 64 at 165.
67 E.g. J. Sopinka, S.N. Lederman & A.W. Bryant, The
Law ofEvidence in Canada
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1992); F.D. Cass, P.Y. Atkinson & J.J. Longo, Discovery : Law,
Practice andProcedure inOntario (Scarborough : Carswell,1993); R.J. Sharpe, "Discovery
Privilege and Preliminary Investigative Reports" (1981) 59 Can. Bar Rev. 830; Sharpe,
supra note 64; Atkinson, supra note 27; Lederman, supra note 27; Williams, supra notes
36 and 61; J.A. Gardner, "Privilege and Discovery : Background and Development in
English and American Law" (1965) 53 Geo. L. J. 585 .
6s A search on the CJ database of Quick-law in June 1998 generated 187 cases with the
phrase "litigation privilege". Many Canadian cases recognize litigation privilege as being
distinct from solicitor-clientprivilege, of which the following are just a selectfew: Toronto
Dominion Bank v. LeighInstruments Ltd. (1997), 32 O.R. (3d) 575 (Gen. Div .) [hereinafter
T-DBank] (workproductprivilege applies only to filesprepared inthe context ofcontemplated
or pending litigation; litigation privilege and solicitor-client privilege are "founded upon
wholly different principles" and intended to achieve different ends); Samson Indian Nation
and Band v. Canada, [199512 F .C. 762 (F.C.A.) (the motions judge erred in restricting
litigation privilege to "documents ... initiated for the dominant purpose of advising in the
conduct of this litigation" ; litigation privilege is to be distinguished from legal advice
privilege, the former is not limited to advice and extends to communications in respect ofany
actual or contemplated litigation) ; Chmara v. Nguyen (1993), 85 Man. R. (2d) 227 (C.A.)
(surveillance videotapes prepared for the dominant purpose of litigation are protected by
litigation privilege ; in contrast with solicitor-client privilege, litigation privilege "addresses
a related but distinctly different concern, that ofthe privacy that is requiredby alawyer in the
preparation of a case in our adversarial system"); International Minerals & Chemical Corp.
(Canada) v. Commonwealth Insurance Co. (1990), 89 Sask. R. 1 (Q.B.) (adjusters' reports
prepared primarily to aid the conduct of litigation are protected by litigation privilege ;
solicitor-client privilege "differs from litigation privilege in several respects, one ofwhich is
that pending litigation is not a requirement", but the "simple expediency of channeling all
communications through legal counsel does not of itself shield the communications from
disclosure": internalmemorandawhicharenotarecordofdirectsolicitor-clientcommunications
mustbe produced); Opron Const. Co. v. Alta. (1989), 71 Alta.L.R. (2d) 28 (C.A.) (documents
created with a dominant purpose for litigation are protected from discovery ; litigation
privilege is "completely separate from privilege for communications to or from a lawyer to
get or receive legal advice", either privilege will suffice to withhold papers); Boulianne v.
Flynn, [197013 O.R. 84(H.C.J.) (amedical reportpreparedfor the purpose oflitigation would
notbeprivilegedin a subsequent action arising outofa different accident; litigation privilege
"rests not on aconcern thatthe expert might otherwise failtomakefull disclosure",buton"the
desirability of a solicitor being uninhibited" in collecting expert opinions for trial whether or
not suchinformation turn out tobefavourable to the client's case), Susan Hosiei y, supra note
14(communications between a solicitor and an accountant acting asthe appellant company's
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Sopinka, Lederman and Bryant in The Law of Evidence in Canada state that
[a]lthough this extension [of litigation privilege] was spawned out of the traditional
solicitor-client privilege, the policy justification for it differed markedly from its
progenitor. It had nothing to do with clients' freedom to consult privately and openly
with their solicitors ; rather, it was founded upon our adversary system oflitigation by
which counsel control fact-presentation before the Court and decide for themselves
which evidence and by what manner ofproof they will adduce facts to establish their
claim or defence, without any obligation to make prior disclosure of the material
acquired in preparation of the case. Accordingly, it is somewhat of a misnomer to
characterize this aspect of privilege under the rubric, (solicitor-client privilege),
which has peculiar reference to the professional relationship between the two
individuals . 9
Whereas solicitor-client privilege aims to protect a relationship (i .e . the
confidential relationship between lawyerand client),litigation privilege aims to
facilitate a process (i .e . the adversary process) 7 0 The different rationales of
these two heads ofprivilege are reflected in theirrespective scope. As itwas set
out in Susan Hosiery,7l solicitor-client privilege protects communications "of
a confidential character, between a client and a legal adviser directly related to
the seeking, formulating or giving of legal advice" ; the scope of litigation
privilege, onthe otherhand, covers "allpapers and materials created or obtained
specially for the lawyer's `brief' for litigation, whether existing or
contemplated" . 72
Crucially, the requirement ofconfidentiality (whichis essential to invoking
solicitor-client privilege) 73 is not applicable to litigation privilege. Litigation
privilege relates to "counsel's work in assembling documents, interviewing
witnesses, consulting with experts, and developing the theory of the client's
case" ;74 as suchit attaches to evennon-confidentialcommunications 75 Materials
"in-gathered" forthepurpose oflitigationmay include photocopies ofdocuments
not originally created in confidence (e.g.,public documents); likewise, witnesses
frequently make statements without any consideration or expectation of

representative are privileged; thereis a distinction between (1) confidential communications
between aclient and alegal adviser for the purpose ofobtaining legal advice, and (2) materials
prepared for the lawyer's brief for existing or contemplated litigation) .
69 Sopinka et al., supra note
67 at 653 . This view has recently been judicially
reaffirmed in T-D Bank, ibid . at 588, quoted below (see text accompanying note 100).
70 Sharpe, supra note 64 at 165 .
7 1 Supra note ;14 at 33 .
72 Ibid.

73 See e .g . T-D Bank, supra note 68 at 584 : "the fatal flaw inthe assertion ofsolicitorclient privilege is the absence of confidentiality ... in order to constitute a privileged
communication, the parties must have intended that it be kept confidential" .
74 Atkinson, supra note 27 at
7. See also the discussion in N.J. Williams, "Four
Questions ofPrivilege : the Litigation Aspect ofLegal Professional Privilege" in I.R. Scott,
ed., International Perspectives on Civil Justice (London : Sweet & Maxwell, 1990) 217 at

221-28 .
75

Sharpe,

supra

note

64

at

164 .
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confidentiality. Nonetheless, both in-gathered documents 76 and witness
statements77 prepared for anticipated litigation are protected by litigation
privilege. Since neither in-gathered document nor witness statement meets the
test of confidentiality7 $ (a requisite condition for solicitor-client privilege), the
fact that they fall within the ambit of litigation privilege attests to the different
underpinnings of these two privileges .79
The regime proposed by Wilson, which conflates solicitor-client privilege
and litigation privilege to protect third party communications whether or not
litigation is contemplated, would not only be contrary to most Canadian
authorities, but it is also at odds with common law jurisprudence around the
world . As noted earlier, in the United States communications with third parties
and other materials prepared in anticipation of litigation are not covered by
attorney-client privilege, but are protected under the rubric of "lawyer's work
product" .so In Britain, the leading text on evidenced recognizes "litigation
privilege" as ahead of privilege separate from"legal advice privilege" . The law
inAustralia, likewise, distinguishes between two "limbs" of"legal professional
privilege", respectively protecting lawyer-client communications and third
party communications .s2
Seee.g. Ottmva-Carleton, supranote62, which heldthat photocopies ofpublic documents
obtained for the dominantpurpose oflitigation were privileged. See also irfa note 96.
77 See e.g. Yri-York- Ltd. v. Commercial Union Assurance Co. (1987), 17 C.P.C. (2d)
1 S1 (Ont. H.C.) (statements from witnesses obtained prior to a lawsuit, but in reasonable
and bonafide anticipation of litigation, are held to be privileged) . Witness statements are
not protected by solicitor-client privilege, see infra note 80.
78 See text infra note 101 .
79 A
similar observation was made by Pincus J. in Dingle v. Commonwealth
Development Bank ofAustralia (1989), 91 A.L.R. 239 (Fed. Cf.); cited in S.B. McNicol,
Law ofPrivilege (Sydney : Law Book, 1992) at 49-50 . Pincus J. suggested in Dingle that
judicial attempts in Australia to justify "legal professional privilege", by appealing to the
confidentiality of solicitor-client communications, are simply "not defensible" so far as
third party communications are concerned .
80 See Hickman, supra note 21 at 508: "We also agree that the memoranda, [witness]
statements and mental impressions in issue inthis casefall outside the scope ofthe attorneyclientprivilege and hence are notprotected from discovery onthatbasis" . The workproduct
doctrine, including the discoverability of witness statements, in the United States is now
governed by the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure : a party cannot obtain a statement made
by a witness other than that party except on the "good cause" showing required for
discovering trial preparation materials generally . See F. James, G.C. Hazard & J. Leubsdorf,
Civil Procedure, 4th ed. (Boston : Little, Brown, 1992) at 250, 258 .
On the importance ofdistinguishing and keeping separate the solicitor-client privilege
and the "exemption of a party from discovery of certain documents", see 8 Wigmore,
Evidence (McNaughton rev . 1961), supra note 34 at 620-28 .
sI C. Tapper, Cross and Tapper on Evidence, 8th ed. (London : Butterworths, 1995)
at483 .Tapperindicated that "while by nomeansidentical, this head of[litigation] privilege
resembles that isolated in the United States as `lawyers' work product"' . Tapper also noted
(ibid. at470)thatlitigationprivilege was distinguished from legal advice privilege inFormica
Ltd. v. Secretarll ofState acting by the Export Credits Guarantee Department, [1995] 1
Lloyd's Rep . 692 (Q.B.), and that LEXIS indicated 102 usages in a search in March 1995.
82 McNicol, supra note 79 at 44-46 .
76
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[I]t has been recognised in Australian cases for some time now, not only that the third
party litigation head ofprivilege exists but also that the popular rationale ofpromoting
candour and trust between lawyer and client is inadequate to explain this third party
litigation head of privilege . 83
It is clear, then, that Wilson's proposal receives little support from the authorities .
Moreover, and this is most telling, for all his rhetoric Wilson does not cite a
single case (and we know of none, certainly no modern ones) which contradicts
the result in Wheeler by extending privilege to third party communications
beyond the litigious context .

(iii) Sources ofConfusion
Despite the modern day consensus that the two privileges are distinct and
have clearly separate rationales, this has not always been the case (as Wilson
correctly observes) notwithstanding that the origin of the distinction goes back
to 1881 in the decision of Wheeler. The English cases of the nineteenth century
are "scarcely notable for their clarity of exposition" 84 and confusion among the
courts and text writers continued well into the twentieth century. 85 Back in
1961, Wigmore observed that
In England the principle of privilege for confidential attorney-client communications
has not been kept entirely separate from the exemption of a party from discovery of
certain documents and prospective witnesses' statements. And in Canada some
confusion persists,s6
Wilson's observation that the modern rationale for litigation privilege is an ex
decision in Wheeler is an accurate one, though he
makes far too much of it . 87 That confusion reigned for a long time is largely

postfacto rationale for the

83 Ibid. at 49 . The quoted passage appears in McNicol's book within the context of an
apparent conundrum: "there is no doubt that difficulties exist in reconciling a third party litigation
head ofprivilege (which has nothing to do with the state of mind of the client) with a privilege
which encourages clients to confide My and candidly in theirlegal advisers". The "difficulties"
described by McNicol, however, may be avoided if the distinct rationales underlying the two
"limbs" of privilege are recognized for what they are, without forcing their reconciliation.
84 Williams, supra note 61 at 47 .
85 See the further
discussion, below, under the heading : Contemporary Confusion .
86 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961), supra note 34 at 620-21 .
87 By implication of Wilson's own admission, the modern rationale of solicitor-client
privilege is itself ex post facto rationalization of an earlier privilege which only exempted
lawyers themselves from "testimonial compulsion" (supra note 2 at 358) . Wilson has no
trouble with that, and rightly so! The real test of any rationalization should not be whether it
is expostfacto, butwhetheritis valid (likewise, the"neighbourprinciple"enunciatedinDonoghue
v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C.562,couldberegarded as expostfactorationalizationofearliertortactions
for negligent conduct, but few would dispute that it was, and still is, good law). Wheeler correctly
decided the scope of solicitor-client privilege, even if the reasoning which led to this decision was
lacking in clarity (see supra note 60) . If Wilson desires to reverse the law of privilege over the past
100 years, surely it is not enough to just attack the reasoning of a single case . At the very least,
one must show how the result in Wheeler and subsequent cases has been wrong . In this
connection, post-Wheeler clarification of the rationale for litigation privilege is just as
relevant. By choosing to characterize and dismiss subsequent literature as ex post facto
rationalization, Wilson does scant justice to the light they shed on the subject.
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attributable to the fact that clear and articulate statements of the rationale for
litigation privilege are rare inAnglo-Canadian case law. WhileSusan Hosiery 88
articulated the distinction between the two privileges, and the distinction is now
well established in the Canadian case law,89 Anglo-Canadian caselaw still lacks
a seminal case similar to the United States decision in Hicknian 90 which (a)
draws a sharp line between the two privileges, (b) points out that there must be
two separate privileges since the very basis of solicitor-client privilege is
confidentiality whereas litigation privilege clearly extends (and must extend in
orderto do itsjob) to communicationsnot founded in confidence, and (c) clearly
provides that litigation privilege is based on protection ofthe "zone ofprivacy"
necessitated by the adversary system of litigation.
To make his case, Wilson relies upon Hodgkinson v. Shnms 9 l from the
British Columbia Court of Appeal, an aberrant decision by modern standards,
in which McEachern C.J.B.C. state d that there is really just
$& Supra note 14 at 33 .
89 See e.g. the cases cited, supra note 68.
90 Supra note 21.
91 Hodgkinson, supra note 8; cited by Wilson, supra note 2 at 365-66, 369-70 .
Wilson also cites with approval(at 376-77) the caseofBellCanada v. plympia & York
Developments Ltd. (1989), 68 O.R. (2d) 103 (H.C.J.) (an expert retained by the plaintiff,
and called as a witness at trial, was not ordered to disclose information supplied to him by
the solicitor acting for the plaintiff) . This decision has been criticized in R .M. Bell, "Drafts
of Experts' Reports: How Far does the Obligation to Produce Extend?" (1992) 13
Advocates' Q. 353 for failing to distinguish adequately between solicitor-client privilege
and litigation privilege :
The decision of Eberle J. is rooted in the desire of ensuring that a party has a
sufficiently large sphere of privacy so as to be able to obtain legal advice without the
concern that such matters will have to be disclosed. This however is the purpose of
solicitor-client privilege, not the litigation privilege which is aimed at protecting
orderly trial preparation. That purpose is served by protecting from disclosure the
reports ofexperts whom aparty does not intend tocall attrial. There isno disincentive
to prepare one's case thoroughly, because negative reports obtained in the course of
that preparation can, in effect, be `buried' (ibid. at 361) .
The opposing line of authorities is therefore to be preferred: i.e. Vancouver Community
College v. Phillips, Barratt (1987), 20 B.C.L.R. (2d) 291 (S.C.) (documents in the
possession of an expert witness who is called to testify, which may be relevant to that
witness' evidence or credibility, shouldbe produced unless it would be unfair orinconsistent
to require such production) and Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1988), 55 D.L.R. (4th)
73 (B.C.S .C.) (privileged information relating to the evidence or credibility of an expert
testifying at trial should be disclosed: there is apresumption oflaw that litigation privilege
is waived when the witness is called to give evidence; still, every effort should be made to
protect litigation privilege which is consistent with the preservation of the integrity of the
trial process).
It is worthnotingthat the actual resultofBell Canada, despite the confused reasoning
in that case, isjustified by Ontario Rule 31 .06 (3), to the extent that documents sought by
the defendant included drafts of reports made by experts other than the one called at trial.
To this extent, the outcome inBell Canada is not irreconcilable with VancoliverCommullity
College, which related to drafts of the testifying expert's own report . Litigation privilege
would not prevent production ofsuch drafts if one accepts the view that the privilege ends
when the expert witness takes the stand at trial.
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one all-embracing privilege that permits the client to speak in confidence to the
solicitor, for the solicitor to undertake such inquiries and collect such material as he
may require properly to advise the client, and for the solicitor to furnish legal services,
all free from any prying or dipping into this most confidential relationship by opposing
interests or anyone . 92
It is submitted that this view seriously confounds the distinct rationales of
litigation privilege and solicitor-client privilege . For reasons given earlier, the
policy justifications for these two privileges are different . Wigmore rightly
remarked that "[c]onfusion can be avoided only if the two principles are kept
within their proper dimensions" 3 McEachern C .J .B .C. faile d to see the "need
to recognize a separate category of immunity against production"94 because he
assumed that confidentiality was the basis of litigation privilege . It is submitted,
however, that confidentiality is not relevant unless the communication for
which privilege is claimed passed between lawyer and client . 95 It is noteworthy
that the result in Hodgkinson (i.e . privilege attached to documents copied and
"in-gathered" for the purpose of litigation) did not turn in any way on what was
said about the "all-embracing privilege" ; i .e . as other cases have shown, 96 the
same result is entailed by an application of the litigation privilege .

9

It is worth reiterating Wigmore's caution :
There are two principles relating to the scope of discovery which have tended to
confuse analysis of the attorney-client privilege . . . Thus, for example, two documents
in the hands of an attorney may be beyond reach of the opposing party-one because
it is a confidential communication to the attorney by the client or his agent, and the
other because it is a communication to the attorney by a prospective third-party
witness . The reason for immunity in the formerinstance is the present [attorney-client]
privilege; the reason in the latter is the totally unrelated rule exempting certain matters
from discovery . 97
As already indicated, the confusion of Wilson and McEachern C .J .B .C . may be
traced back to earlier sources and the confusing language of early English cases,
92 Hodgkinson, supra note at 136
8
.
93 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev . 1961), supra note 34 at 628 .
94 Hodgkinson, supra note 8 at 134 .

95 See Williams, supra note 74 at 231 ; see also text above accompanying note 74 .
96 E .g . Ottawa-Carleton, supra note 62 . Although Hodgkinson was cited in OttawaCarleton, the latter made no reference to any "all-embracing privilege" ; instead, it focused
correctly on the need "to preserve the integrity of the adversarial system" as being the
justification of the privilege.
The British Columbia Court of Appeal revisited the issue of privileged in-gathered
documents in Hunt v . T & N plc (1993), 15 C .P .C . (3d) 134 (B .C .C.A .) (plaintiff's copies
of documents which originated with the defendant, obtained by the plaintiff's lawyers for
the purpose of asbestos litigation, were held to be privileged ; production of the documents
would have disclosed the plaintiff's selection strategy) . Hinkson J .A ., delivering a
unanimous judgment, suggested that the majority decision in Hodgkinson was based on the
concern that revealing "the contents of the solicitor's brief would permit the opponents to
look into counsel's mind" . Hinkson J.A. also cited Ottawa-Carleton with approval and
relied on its reasoning (i .e . counsel must be free to investigate without risking disclosure)
in the Hunt ruling .
97 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev
. 1961), supra note 34 at 620, 628 .
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some of which were cited in Hodgkinson 98 and left their mark in the reasoning
ofMcEachern C.J.B.C. With respect, his view is now antiquated, 99 and clearly
rejected by Winkler J. in a recent statement of the law:
[T]he lawyer's work-product privilege, as abranch of litigation privilege, is founded
upon wholly different principles than solicitor-client privilege, and is intended to
achieve a different end . To extend the work-product privilege to files created solely
for the purpose of giving advice would be to seriously misapprehend the purpose of
the privilege . 100
(iv) Contemporary Confusion

Confusion continues even today, resulting from misguided attempts to
import the requirement ofconfidentiality into litigationprivilege, and also from
the use of confusing terminology and the lack of a consistent scheme in
categorizing the two privileges .
A major contributor to this contemporary confusion was the 1975 case of

Strass v. Goldsack. 101 At issue in Strass was whether privilege attached to a

particular type of witness statement, i.e. a statement given by one party to the
other (one made by the plaintiff to the defendant's insurance adjuster). The
Alberta Supreme Court (Appellate Division) decided that no privilege attached
to such a statement . While this holding is sensible in itself,l0' the court's
reasoning is problematic . The majority took as their starting point that, after the

E.g. Lyell v. Kennedy (1884), 27 Ch. D. 1 (C.A.) (copies of public records and
inscriptions on tombstones, etc . which the defendant's solicitor had obtained for the
purpose ofthe defence wereheldto beprivileged ; acollection ofrecords might be the result
ofprofessional knowledge, research and skill, production would show what the solicitor
thought of the client's case). The decision itself is consistent with our suggested purpose
oflitigation privilege, but the language inLyell is confusing because ofits reference to the
rationale of solicitor-client privilege .
99 Even if it is true that the lawyer's brief (defined by Wilson, supra note 2 at 365, as
"notes, thoughts and preparation") has traditionally been protected by solicitor-client
privilege (ibid. at 366), notice ought to be taken of the more recent developments . The law
has clarified itself. Just as solicitor-client privilege becomes what it is "in stages",
originating in a mere exemption of lawyers from testimonial compulsion (Solosky, supra
note 19 at 834), so it is over time that litigation privilege becomes distinguished from its
progenitor (solicitor-client privilege) by its markedly different rationale . See supra note
87; see also the modern academic and judicial authorities cited supra notes 67 and 68.
loo T-D Bank, supra note 68 at 588 .
101 [197516 W.W.R. 155 (Alta. S.C.App.Div .) [hereinafter Strass] (privilege was
denied to a statement obtained from the plaintiff, by the defendant's insurer for the purpose
ofanticipated litigation, because Wigmore's criteria for confidential communication had
not been met).
102 There is nothing objectionable in the result ofStrass (i.e. requiring the disclosure
of what in fairness ought to be produced) . In the United States, for example, although a
showing of"good cause" is required before statements made by non-party witnesses can
be obtained by aparty, the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure specifically provide (in Rule
26 (b)(3)) that "a party may obtain without the required showing [of `good cause'] a
statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by that party"
[emphasis added].
98
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decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Slavutych v. Baker, 103
communications could now be privileged only if the four conditions of
confidentiality laid down by Wigmore are present, 104 and this applied to
litigation privilege . Since the statement in issue was not intended to be
confidential it did not meet this test. However, McDonald J. went on to suggest
that "statements given by stranger-witnesses ... are communications to which a
privilege should attach", 105 According to McDonald J., such statements would
pass Wigmore's confidentiality test and they should be privileged in order that
candid information may be obtained from stranger-witnesses . 106
As Professor Lederman (now Mr. Justice Lederman) pointed out,l07 the
Alberta court's approach andMcDonald J's suggestion thatwitness statements are
privileged as confidential communications so astoencourage full and frank disclosure
by witnesses, are misconceived. McDonald J.'s comments implied that the privilege
belongs to the witness, andlost sight of the factthatitis the party collecting the evidence
whoassertsprivilege .Appropriately,Ledennancriticizedthemajorityopinionashaving
confused the policy bases of sôlicitor-client privilege (confidentiality within a
relationship) and litigation privilege (the adversary process):
[Wigmore] did not design his conditions with "anticipation-of-litigation"
communications or "work-product" material in mind . .. Thefundamental flawin D.C.
McDonald J.'s reasoning, therefore, is his conclusion that Canadian courts should
now applyWigmore's four criteria to every communication over which aprivilege is
sought, to determine whether a court should accede to it. 108
Generally, Ontario courts have quite sensibly held that where a party has given a
statement to an opposing party, the party is entitled to production of his or her own
statement, though the reasoning used in the cases is notconsistent ; e.g. some cases hold the
statement is not covered by litigation privilege, while others hold the statement is covered
but that fairness requires a copy be provided to the party who made the statement . See the
case law collected in G.D. Watson & C. Perkins, Holmested and Watson : Ontario Civil
Procedure, looseleaf vol. 3 (Toronto : Carswell, 1998) at 30 § 30[2].
103 [197514 W.W.R. 620
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter Slavutych] (confidential statement
made by a university professor to a tenure committee, concerning another colleague, was
held to be inadmissible in subsequent dismissal proceeding against the professor himself,
i.e. the one who made the statement . The court relied on the equitable principle ofbreach
of confidencein its ruling, but Spence J. also observed in obiter dicta that the professor's
statement could have been excluded on the basis ofrelational privilege, since Wigmore's
criteria for confidential communication were satisfied).
104 The Wigmore criteria are : (1) the communications must originate in a confidence
that they will not be disclosed ; (2) this element of confidentiality must be essential to the
full and satisfactory maintenance ofthe relation between the parties ; (3) the relation must
be one which inthe opinion ofthe community ought to besedulouslyfostered; (4) the injury
that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater
than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation . See 8 Wigmore,
Evidence (McNaughton rev . 1961), supra note34 at 527 ; quoted by bothClement J.A. and
McDonald J., supra note 101 at 159 & 166 .
105 Strass, supra note 101 at
171 .
106

Ibid .

S.N. Lederman, "Discovery-Production of Documents-Claim of Privilege to
Prevent Disclosure" (1976) 54 Can . Bar Rev. 422 at 433-34.
108 Ibid. at 431, 432 .
107
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In dissent in Strass, McGillivray C .J .A . held that confidentiality is irrelevant to
litigation privilege and put the matter succinctly : "[t]he fact that the person
giving the statement has no reason to think it confidential, has, in my view,
precisely nothing to do with the matter" . 109
Itis significant that Wigmore's privilege test was developed forconfidential
communications. 110 Litigation privilege, being necessitated by the adversary
nature of trial, is not a "Wigmorian privilege" ; i.e . it protects materials which
may not be communications (a lawyer's mental impressions, opinions, etc .) and
communications which may not be confidential . The American practice (i.e .
strictly separating the work product doctrine from a Wigmorian analysis of
privilege) 11 is therefore sensible, for only then is it possible to speak of
confidentiality as being the unifying thread of "privilege" .
Unfortunately, the only Canadian text devoted to the subject of solicitor-client
privilege, Manes & Silver, 112 adopts the fallacy which beset the majority in Strass
(i .e . misapplying the requirement of confidentiality to litigation privilege) . These
authors state that the requirement of confidentiality is applicable to litigation
privilege. 113 While they observe that most "witnesses probably do not think about
confidentiality when giving a statement", and that the "privileged status of witness
statements poses a prominent challenge to the required intention of
confidentiality", 114 they nonetheless conclude that the privilege can be explained
in terms of the "solicitor's/client's expectation of confidentiality when obtaining
the statements in contemplation of litigation". 115 Manes & Silver argue that
"confidentiality is the thread which binds the law of privilege, and so it is with
[communications made in contemplation of litigation]" . 116 As already indicated,
in our view, these authors' approach reflects an erroneous and unnecessary attempt
to tie litigation privilege to confidentiality . 117
109 Strass, supra note 101 at 177 . McGillivray C.J.A . went on as follows : "While the basis
of the solicitor-and-client privilege may initially have been constricted to matters confidentially
communicated by the client to his solicitor, it is clear that the common law has gone far beyond
this, and as of this date statements from witnesses obtained in anticipation of litigation, and
for the benefit of the advice of counsel, are not the subject of production, and this, in my
submission, whether the statements were obtained from the witnesses confidentially or not"
(ibid. at 178) . See also N .J. Williams, "Four Questions of Privilege : the Litigation Aspect of
Legal Professional Privilege" in I .R. Scott, ed., International Perspectives on Civil Justice
(London : Sweet & Maxwell, 1990) 217 at 228-31 .
110 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev . 1961), supra note 34 at 527 .
111 See the Wigmore quotes in text above accompanying notes 86 & 97 .
112 R .D. Manes & M.P. Silver, Solicitor-Client Privilege in Canadian Law (Toronto :
Butterworths, 1993) .
113 Manes & Silver take this position despite their own criticism that McDonald J.'s
attempt to "[graft] upon a stranger-witness the intention of confidentiality" was "artificial"
(ibid. at 102-103) . These authors may not be aware of Lederman's critique of Strass as it
is not mentioned in their book, rather the authors state that "Strass clearly stands for the
proposition that the intention of confidentiality is required" (ibid. at 102) .
114 Ibid. at 102 .
115 Ibid. at 103 .
116 Ibid. at 100 .
117 Manes & Silver, ibid. at 9, state that confusion has been caused by many cases
(specific references being made to a number of English cases) which fail to make a clear
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Manes & Silver further confuse matters by coining a term for third parry
communications made in contemplation of litigation: "derivative
communications". They argue that "where the courts have held such
communications to be privileged, it is because they are derived from the
solicitor-client relationship and the rationale for extending privilege to the
relationship". 118 This notion of "derivative communications" is unhelpful and
confuses analysis by assuming that litigation privilege is based on the rationale
ofsolicitor-client privilege (i.e. confidentiality) . Manes & Silver miss the mark
in asserting that "ifsuch [third party] communications aremade in contemplation
of litigation, the law treats the communication as if it were made directly
betweensolicitor andclient". 119 As we will see, the law infact subjects litigation
privilege to a much greater degree of "truncation" than solicitor-client
privilege. 120
Given the important distinction between litigation privilege and solicitorclient privilege, it is imperative that our use of terminology recognize them as
being independent. It is, as Sopinka, Lederman andBryant indicate, amisnomer
to characterize litigationprivilege undertherubric ofsolicitor-client privilege. 121
Similarly, much confusion surrounds the inconsistent usage of the term "legal
professional privilege". In Cross and Tapper on Evidence 122 this term is used
as an umbrella term comprising "legal advice privilege" and "litigation
privilege".123 Confusion builds when both Sharpe 124 and Cass et al . 125 treat
"legalprofessionalprivilege" as asynonymfor"litigationprivilege" . Meanwhile,
Manes & Silver define "legal professional privilege" as a sub-category (along
with "contemplated litigation privilege") of an overarching "solicitor-client
privilege".126 We suggest, in the interest of clarity, that the unmanageable
terminology of "legal professional privilege" be abandoned. It suffices to speak
of two privileges, i.e. solicitor-client privilege and litigation privilege, so long
as the latter is not subsumed under the former.

distinction between litigation privilege and the privilege involving direct solicitor-client
communications . Wesuggestthat these authors have themselves contributedto the confusion
by their insistence that confidentiality is a cardinal principle even for litigation privilege.
118 Ibid. at 4.
119
Ibid . at 89 .
121 S ee the further
discussion, below, under the heading: "Truncated" Nature of

Litigation Privilege .
121 Sopinka et al., supra note 67
122 Supra note
81 .

at 653.

This classification is similar to that in McNicol, supra note 79 .
"Discovery-Privilege and Preliminary Investigative Reports" (1981)
59 Can. Bar Rev. 830 at 833.
125 F.D. Cass, P.Y.
Atkinson & J.J. Longo, Discovery: Law, Practice andProcedure
in Ontario (Scarborough : Carswell, 1993) at 401.
126 Manes
& Silver, supra note 112 at 7.
123

124 R.J. Sharpe,
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(v.) Consequences of Confusing the Role of Confidentiality
As indicated earlier, confidentiality is the essence ofsolicitor-clientprivilege,
though it is not required of litigation privilege . This is so because the two
privileges rest on different rationales. Confusing the role of confidentiality with
respect to each privilege may lead to the following consequences : (a) the
requirement of confidentiality may be neglected in the assertion of solicitorclient privilege, or (b) the requirement may be imported to litigation privilege .
The former is inherent in Wilson's statement that "[i]fthe client and his counsel
could safely rely on solicitor-client privilege to protect communications with
third persons and any other work of the lawyer in the non-litigious context, it is
evidentthatno otherrationale forprivilege is requiredinthe litigious context". 127
The truth is, solicitor-client privilege cannot be relied on to protect any nonconfidential communications, 128 whether itis between lawyer-client orbetween
lawyer-third party, and whether the context is litigious or non-litigious .
On the other hand, the consequence of importing the requirement of
confidentiality to litigation privilege is equally undesirable . Under such a
scheme, communications not originating inconfidence (e.g. witness statements
and copies of unprivileged original documents "in-gathered" for the purpose of
litigation) would no longer be privileged. Yet there is no justification to so
diminish the protection for materials prepared in anticipation of litigation, 129
currently covered by litigation privilege. The litigation lawyer's brief
symbolises the time and effort and the professional knowledge and skill which the
lawyer has invested on behalf of the client in finding the evidence and investigating
the case. Under an adversary system, it is the prerogative ofthe party to detennine how
the yield from that investment is to be dealt with, whether it is to be disclosed to the
other side or to the court, and when. 130
The policy objectives behind litigation privilege, identified in Hick-rnan, 131
must not be forgotten . As Sharpe put it, "[t]he adversary system depends upon
careful and thorough investigation and preparation by the parties through their
counsel . The adversarial advocate cannot prepare without the protection afforded
by a zone ofprivacy. Discovery andprivilege must strike a delicate balance". 132
Wilson, supra note 2 at 372 .
Notably, Dickson J. (as he then was) stated in Solosky, supra note 19 at 835, that
"where the communication is not intended to be confidential, privilege will not attach" .
129 McEachern C.J.B.C. agreed (Hodgkinson, supra note 8 at 143) that
seeking the
production of documents so as to "look into counsel's inind to learn what he knows, and
what he does not know, and the direction in which he is proceeding in the preparation of
his client's case . .. would be a mischief that should be avoided" [emphasis added] .
Presumably, the "all-embracing privilege" he proposed would guard against this mischief
too. McEachem C.J.B.C. did not, however, articulate any test for this privilege . If
confidentiality is the test to be met, it is hard to see how the "mischief' can be avoided .
130 Williams, supra note 36 at 144 .
131 Hickman, supra note 21 at 510 : "it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain
degree ofprivacy, freefrom unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel".
132 Sharpe, supra note 64 at 167.
127
128
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Striking this "delicate balance" would, however, become a hopeless task if one
plunges into the conceptual confusion just described.
(vi.) "Truncated" Nature ofLitigation Privilege
Wilson quite accurately observes that, in comparison with solicitor-client
privilege, litigation privilege is "truncated". 133 This is so in several ways .
First, and most importantly, the general principle is that relevant facts
contained in a document protected by litigation privilege (although not the
document itself) are subject to disclosure on examination for discovery, i.e . a
party examined for discovery may not refuse to disclose material facts on the
ground that the only source of her knowledge of such facts is a document
covered by litigation privilege .134 By contrast, the content of solicitor-client
communications (e .g . the substance of legal advice received from a lawyer) is
not required to be divulged as a rule. 135

Second, in the case of litigation privilege the courts and rules committees
have felt a greater freedom to qualify or "truncate" the privilege forthe purpose
of maintaining what is perceived to be a reasonable balance between pretrial
disclosure and privilege, or on the grounds of fairness . For example, the names
and addresses of witnesses are now discoverable under Ontario Rule 31 .06 (2);
and a party examined for discovery may not refuse to answer any questions on
the ground that the information sought is "evidence" (Ontario Rule 31 . 06
(1)) . 136 In addition, the Ontario case lawnow holds that a party may be required
137
to provide a summary of the evidence that a witness is expected to give .
Likewise, Ontario Rule 31 .06 (3) requires the disclosure at examination for
discovery of expert opinions unless a party undertakes not to call the expert as
a witness at trial (the production of reports of trial experts is governed by
Ontario Rule 53 .03 (1)) . Also Ontario Rules 33 .04 and 33 .06 (re court ordered
medical examinations) require the production of medical reports formerly
covered by the litigation privilege.
133

Wilson, supra note 2 at 356.
e.g . AprilInvestmentsLimitedv. Menat ConstructionsLimited (1975),11 O.R.
(2d) 364 (H.C .); Rubinoff v. Newton, [1967] 1 O.R. 402 (H.C .) ; Murray v. Woodstock
GeneralHospital Trust (1988), 66 O.R . (2d) 129 (Div . Ct .) (while surveillance movies and
reports are themselves covered by the litigation privilege, in fairness the plaintiffis entitled
to considerable disclosure of the details of the surveillance) . Theapproach in the latter case
(requiring disclosure of the details of surveillance) has been rejected in some other
provinces: see e.g. Chmara v. Nguyen (1993), 85 Man. R. (2d) 227 (C .A.) ; Breau v . Naddy
(1995), 133 Nfld. & P.E .I.R . 196 (P.E .I. T.D.) .
135 Butdisclosure may be required where solicitor-client privilege is held to have been
waived; see supra note 41 .
136 Whether the former restrictions on the disclosure of evidence and the identity of
witnesses, now abrogated by Ontario Rules 31 .06 (1) and (2), were theresult of privilege
(see Williams, supra note 61) is now a somewhat moot point. On thewhole question of the
impact of the Rules of Civil Procedure on privilege for trial preparation materials, see
Sharpe, supra note 64 .
134 See
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This erosion oflitigation privilege has been accompanied by the Canadian
adoption of the dominant purpose rule, enunciated by the House of Lords in
Waugh v . British Railways Board, 138 imposing a more onerous test to be met
before communications will attract litigation privilege . Prior to Waugh,
documents created for multiple purposes (,e .g. accident reports prepared for
bureaucratic purposes as well as for the instruction of counsel) were privileged
so long as anticipation of litigation was a substantial purpose of creating the
documents. 139 Waugh decided, however, to raise the threshold requirement for
privilege to attach . In Waugh, the defendant railway board asserted privilege in
a multi-purpose bureaucratic report, prepared shortly aftera locomotive collision
in which the plaintiff's husband (an employee of the board) was killed. The
House of Lords held that for privilege to apply, it was not enough that
anticipated litigation was a "substantial purpose" ofpreparing the report. While
Waugh refused to follow the Australian High Court in requiring that litigation
be the "sole purpose" of creating the document, 140 it did require anticipation of
litigation to be the "dominant purpose":
It is clear that the due administration of justice strongly requires disclosure and
production of this report : it was contemporary, it contained statements by witnesses
on the spot, it would be not merely relevant evidence, but almost certainly the best
evidence as to the cause of the accident. If one accepts that this important public
interest can be over-ridden in order that the defendant may properly prepare his case,
how close must the connection be between the preparation of the document and the
anticipation of litigation? . .. It appears to me that unless the purpose ofsubmission to
the legal adviser in view of litigation is at least the dominant purpose for which the
relevant document was prepared, the reasons which require privilege to be extended
to it cannot apply. 141
137
See e.g. Dionisopoulos v . Prorias (1990), 71 O.R. (2d) 547 (H.C.) (onexamination
for discovery, a party must provide the names and addresses of persons who might have
knowledge ofthe matters in issue and, if requested, a summary of their evidence).
138 Waugh, supra note 53.
139 This principle was applied, for example, in Vernon v . Board of Education for the
Borough ofNorth York (1975), 9 O.R. (2d) 613 (H.C.J.). In that case, the plaintiff fell at a
public school and suedfordamages, alleging negligence and breach ofduty to maintain the
premises . The vice-principal had made an incident report to the school board, and sent a
copy to the defendant board's insurer asrequired by its insurancepolicy . The courtdecided
that the report was privileged, notwithstanding the fact that such reports were routinely
required whenever accidents occurred, and used by the school board for various purposes.
Citing Blackstone v . Mutual Life Insurance Co . of New York, [ 1944] O.R. 328 (C.A.), the
court considered it sufficient that anticipated litigation was "the substantial, or one of the
substantial, purposes" of preparing the document in question.
140
Grant v . Downs (1976), 135 C.L.R. 674 (H.C. of Aust.) (privilege was denied to
certain reports made to the Department ofPublic Health following the death of apatient at
a psychiatric centre . Although "one of the material purposes" ofpreparing the documents
was to submit them to legal advisers, the court held that in order to attract privilege, those
documents must have been brought into existence for "the sole purpose of submission to
legal advisers for advice or for use in legal proceedings").
141 Waugh, supra note 53 at 531-33 . Manes & Silver, supra note 112 at 93, suggest
that the dominant purpose test consists of three elements :
First, [the document sought to be privileged] must have been produced with
contemplated litigation in mind. The document cannot have existed before and been
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Since the Waugh ruling, Canadian courts have adopted both the dominant
purpose test and its underlying rationale . As a result, accident reports which
"over a decade ago would not have been disclosed are now routinely ordered to
be produced unless the dominant purpose rule with respect to such documents
can be satisfied". 142
The combined operation of the dominant purpose test and the "truncation"
of litigation privilege described earlier has circumscribed the privilege within
anarrower scope. Moreover, thiscurtailment has proceeded without any clearly
articulated principle, other than fairness or the often vaguely expressed purpose
ofmaintaining a reasonable balance between pretrial disclosure and privilege .
By contrast the analogous United States "work product doctrine" has been
viewed and expressed from its inception, not as a privilege at al1, 143 but as a
qualifiedimmunity from discovery. On close analysis the United States doctrine
is not concerned with whether certain information is discoverable, but with how
it is to be obtained. The court in Hickman was concerned that discovery might
be abused as a means of conducting trials "on wits borrowed from the
adversary", and that parties would not prepare vigorously for fear ofhaving to
turn their preparation over to the opponent, with the result that the adversary
system would break down. In Hickman disclosure of witness statements was
refused sincethere was no "showing of necessity" inthat case for the information
sought; the party seeking disclosure was free to depose the witnesses under
United States practice, and that is what the court required the party to do. The
court stated, however, that
[w]here relevant and non-privileged facts remain hidden in an attorney's file and
where production ofthose facts is essential tothepreparation ofone's case, discovery
may properly be had ... And production might be justified where the witnesses are no
longer available or can be reached only with difficulty.144
Under the United States doctrine upon such a showing ofgood cause production
may be ordered of virtually any information other than the mental impressions
(strategic thinking) of the opposing lawyer . 145
merely obtainedby thepartyto give to the solicitor . Second, the document musthave
been produced for the dominant purpose ofreceiving legal advice or as an aid to the
conduct of litigation -in other words for the dominant purpose oflitigation. Third,
the prospect of litigation must be reasonable - meaning that there is a reasonable
contemplation of litigation.
142
Atkinson, supra note 27 at 7 .
143 Lederman, supra
note 107 at 424, observes that while litigation privilege is "long
steeped in Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence, it is only in 1947, in the case of Hickman v.
Taylor, supra note 21, that the Americans firmly developed something comparable to [it],
which they termed the 'work-product' doctrine" .
144 Hickman, supra
note 21 at 511 .
145
Asindicated supra note 21, the Hickman ruling has been codified byRule 26 (b)(3)
ofthe U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that
aparty may obtain discovery ofdocuments and tangible things otherwise discoverable
... and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by
orforthat otherparty's representative (including the otherparty's attorney, consultant,
surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking
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This raises the question of whether Canadian courts should follow the
United States lead and openly exercise a discretion to overrule a claim of
litigation privilege whenever "good cause" exists . The case law in Ontario, in
at least one context, has actually moved beyond the United States position by
requiring that a summary of witness evidence be provided to the opposite party
on examination for discovery, even without the showing of good cause. 146 For
reasons ofeconomy (i.e. to avoid the expense associated with examining nonparties) the Ontario Rules ofCivil Procedure require, as one of the prerequisites
to obtaining leave to examine a non-party, that a party seek to obtain from its
opponent the evidence of relevant non-parties . 147 Consequently, while the
expectation of due diligence operates to protect witness statements from
discovery in the United States, the same consideration may not support the
protection of witness statements in Ontario . Indeed, if an Ontario court were to
rule on the facts of Hicknran today, the claim of privilege in regard to witness
statements would likely be denied.
While the truncation of litigation privilege has already gone far, it may be
that litigation privilege should, in other contexts, be qualified when "good
cause" (as it is known in the United States) exists, i.e . where a "party is unable
without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by
other means" . In this respect, the Nova Scotia case of Davies v. Harrington 148
discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's case
and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial
equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials
when the required showing has been made, the court shallprotectagainstdisclosure
of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or
other representative of a party concerning the litigation [emphasis added].
Lawyers' mental impressions, therefore, receive special protection under the Federal
Rules. Accordingly, any trial preparation materials ordered to be produced would be
"redacted" so as not to reveal the lawyer's strategic thinking. See James, Hazard &
Leubsdorf, supra note 80 at 258 . See generally C.A. Wright, A.R. Miller & R.L. Marcus,
Federal Practice andProcedure, 2d ed., vol. 8 (St . Paul: West, 1994).
Discovery of experts' findings and opinions is governed in the United States by
Federal Rule 26 (b)(4), according to which a party may depose trial experts after receiving
their reports . The rule also permits the discovery of "facts known or opinions held by an
expert who has been retained .. . and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial",
upon a showing of "exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party
seeking discovery toobtain facts oropinions on the same subject byothermeans" . Contrary
to this American approach, the Ontario Rules provide for neither the deposition of experts
nor the exceptional discovery of experts who are not expected to testify at trials.
146 See
supra note 137.
147 Contrary to the approach in the United States of permitting unlimited examination
for discovery of non-parties, Ontario Rule 31.10 prohibits the courts from granting leave
to examine non-parties unless it is satisfied, among other things, that "the moving party has
beenunable to obtain the information from otherpersons whom the moving partyis entitled
to examine for discovery, or from the person he or she seeks to examine" .
148 (1980), 115 D.L.R. (3d) 347 (N.S.C.A.) [hereinafterDavies] (an engineer's report
prepared for the plaintiff in determining the origin of a fire, which could no longer be
replicated by the defendant in an action commenced after the rebuilding ofthe damaged
premises, was held not privileged) .
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is illustrative . In Davies, a fire caused extensive damage to the plaintiff's
premises . The insurer of the property retained an engineer to investigate the
cause ofthe fire, and a report was prepared shortly afterwards . The premises was
subsequently rebuilt . When a subrogated action was commenced against the
defendant (alleging negligent operation of a truck which collided with a power
pole, causing the fire in question) nearly a year after the incident, "no remnants
of the fire damage could be seen" any longer . 149 The Nova Scotia Court of
Appeal held that the engineer's report was not privileged from production,
because it was not prepared for the dominant purpose of litigation. As Sharpe
observes, this application of the dominantpurpose test is open to question, since
the evidence suggests that "apart from the prospect of a lawsuit, there was no
other reason for obtaining the report", 150 Nonetheless, as Sharpe points out,
[t]he advantage of production to foster a fair trial is obvious . As the building had been
reconstructed prior to the commencement of the action, the defendant had no way of
obtaining information he would need to make out a defence. If refused production, he
would have to wait until trial, when developing an exculpatory explanation for the fire
would be difficult if not impossible. 151
The Davies ruling, and numerous other cases, 152 illustrate how the dominant
purpose test can be and is being manipulated to effectively "qualify" litigation
149 Ibid. at 349 .
150 Sharpe,

supra note 124 at 831 .

151 Ibid. at 838
.
152 See the case law collected in G .D . Watson & C. Perkins, Holmested and Watson :

Ontario Civil Procedure, looseleaf vol. 3 (Toronto : Carswell, 1998) at 30 § 31[2],
illustrating that the application of the "dominant purpose test" in the area of accidentreports
and adjusters'/ investigators' reports can be quite unpredictable, with some courts finding
that the test is met whenever litigation is contemplated (or even likely to ensue), and other
courts holding that the contemplation of litigation (or its likelihood) is insufficient to satisfy
the dominant purpose test. Some examples of cases manipulating the test, as in Davies, to
ensure disclosure are: Breau v. Naddy (1995), 133 Nfld. & P.E.I.R . 196 (P.E.I . T.D .) (an
adjuster's reports made before counsel was retained were not privileged; they were made for
the purpose of claiming insurance benefits, not to defend the action) ; Parker v. London Life
Insurance Co . (1992), [1993] I.L.R .1-2911(B .C .Master) (where aninsurerhadinvestigative
reports and surveillance tapes made in order to determine an insured's eligibility for benefits,
the court held that notwithstanding litigation was a reasonable prospect, the reports and tapes
had been made in the ordinary course ofbusiness and were thus notprivileged) ;AdamsMotors
(Wetaskiwin) Ltd. v . Transamerica Life Insurance Co . of Canada (1992), 5 C.P.C . (3d) 170
(Alta . Q.B .) (where documents were generated for the initial purpose of deciding whether to
accept or reject a claim and to investigate all aspects of the claim, the court held that no
privilege attached; it could not be said that the documents were acquired or generated only for
the purpose of instructing counsel and preparing for litigation); MacDonald v. Wellington
Insurance Co . (1992),12 C .P.C. (3d) 269 (N.S . T .D .) (where the heading on a report claimed
it was confidential but its author was not aware that it was to be referred to a solicitor, the court
ordered production of the report ; the dominant purpose for which the report was prepared
was to determine the cause of the fire and whether to pay the claim ; a heading claiming
confidentiality is not determinative of privilege).
For a case very similar to Davies, and specifically referring to the difficulty of
replicating the information in the report being sought, see Butterfield v . Dickson (1994),
28 C.P .C . (3d) 242 (N .W.T. S .C .) (where two insurance adjuster's reports on a boating
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privilege, where successful assertion of the privilege would lead to a result
perceived to be unjust.
Hence it can be argued that in practice if not in theory the "good cause"
exception to litigation privilege does already exist. This being so, a strong case
can be made that the courts should exercise their discretionary power more
openly. Instead of "regulating" litigation privilege through manipulating the
language of"dominant purpose" and "anticipation oflitigation", it is preferable
that the "good cause" exception be articulated (i.e. where "a party is unable
without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by
othermeans") and the interests meant tobe protected (i.e. truth-finding and trial
fairness) be made explicit. Incidentally, this is roughly what the (now almost
forgotten) Report on Evidence by the Law Reform Commission of Canada
recommended. 153
V. Agents and Third Parties Distinguished
A related problem, which also bears on the scope of privilege, has been caused
by the fuzzy distinction between "agents" and "third parties". The fuzziness is
unfortunate, as the distinction leads to crucial differences in results . IfX (a third
person) communicates with a lawyer as the client's agent, the communication
is one between the client and the solicitor, and the communication is covered by
solicitor-client privilege ifmade in confidence forthe purpose ofobtaining legal
advice for the client. By contrast, if X's communication is that of a mere third
party, rather than an agent of the client, solicitor-client privilege will never
apply (though litigation privilege will apply if the dominant purpose of the
communication is for actual or contemplated litigation) .
The root of the problem, again, goes back to the early English case law.
Wigmore observed that in Anderson 154 and Wheeler, 155 "the line between a
mere witness and an agent of the solicitor appeared to be ignored" . 156 More
recently, Wilson inherits this confusion when he argues, on the strength of
accident had been preparedbeforecounsel was retained and a third after, the courtheld they
were not privileged ; they had not been produced because litigation was the dominant
purpose ; the co-extensive aim had been investigation; also, as a result ofthe investigation,
the boat was no longer in its former condition and other parties were to have access to the
reports so as to assess the effect of any changes) .
153 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Report on Evidence (Ottawa: Minister of
Supply and Services Canada, 1977) at 31, where s. 42 (2) of the proposed Evidence Code
reads :
A person has a privilege against disclosure ofinformation obtained orwork produced
in contemplation of litigation by him or his lawyer or a person employed to assist the
lawyer, unless, in the case of information, it is not reasonably available from another
source and its probative value substantially outweighs the disadvantages that would
be caused by its disclosure [emphasis added].
154
Supra note 56.
155 Snpra note 3.
156 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev . 1961), supra note 34 at 621 .
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Anderson, that the rationale of solicitor-client privilege had been the basis for

extending privilege to third party communications. 157 Wilson emphasizes the
fact that "the solicitor may employ his clerks or other agents to collect
information for him, and upon the same principle it is equally protected"
[emphasis in original] . 158 The statement just quoted, however, does not support
Wilson's contentionthat thirdparty communications are privileged on the same
grounds as, solicitor-client communications : all that it confirms is that
communications by agents are equally protected as solicitor-client privilege .
In law, communications with "agents" are treated differently from those
with "third parties", as Sopinka, L,ederman and Bryant explain :
The lawyer in the ordinary course ofhis practice utilizes employees such as articling
students, law clerks and secretaries . Communication to such agents for the purpose of
facilitating the obtaining of legal advice is equally protected [by solicitor-client
privilege] ... If, however, the communication is made to a person who must himself
consider and act uponit, no privilege arises even though theresult ofthe decision may
necessarily be the retention of a solicitor ... Because these communications through
agents are not normally made in a litigious atmosphere, this situation must be
distinguishedfrom the case where a thirdparty is retained to obtain facts or to make
a report to assist the client or his solicitor in litigation [emphasis added] . 159

This distinction is also recognized by Cross and Tapper on Evidence :
It should be noted that both client and legal adviser can act through an agent, and it is
often a difficult question whether the communication was between client and legal
adviser through an agent in which caselegaladvice privilege is apposite and litigation
neednot be contemplated, orwhether the intermediary isnot toberegarded as the alter
ego ofclient or legal adviser, in which case the availability ofthe privilege depends
upon the contemplation oflitigation. 160
In other words, solicitor-client privilege can be extended through the principle
of agency to cover communications involving an "intermediary", where that
"intermediary" is acting as an "agent" . This extension is inapplicable, however,
to "third party" communications, which are protected by litigation privilege
only. The difficult issueis, ofcourse, how to distinguish between an "agent" and
a "third party".
From our earlier analysis (specifically, the policy arguments against the
extension of solicitor-client privilege to thirdparty communications), itfollows
that the notion of agency should be construed narrowly in the context of
privilege . There are unproblematic circumstances to which the principle of
157

Wilson, supra note 2 at 362.

158 Ibid .

159 Sopinka et al., supra note 67 at 650. See also Manes & Silver, supra note 112 at
73 : "Different treatment is given to communications from agents versus those from third
parties . Agents act in place ofthesolicitor/client or under the solicitor's/client's directions.
Third parties act for themselves . Wherethe communication between thesolicitor and client
is made by or through an agent of the solicitor and/or an agent of the client, the
communication remains privileged as a direct communication, as long as it relates to the
receiving or giving of professional legal advice".
160 Tapper, supra note 81 at 485.
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agency clearly applies (e.g. law clerks and secretaries employed by a lawyer) .
Nonetheless, a broad definition of client's agents (as opposed to lawyer's
agents) may easily be turned into adevice for asserting aprivilege not otherwise
available,by any clients or courts willing toadorn "thirdparty" communications
with the badge of "agency". Having regard to the impact of privilege (i.e. the
"sacrifice of availability ofevidence relevant to the administration ofjustice"),
a sensible approach to drawing the line between "agents" and "third parties"
would be one which confines agency within the narrowest scope. 161
Unless such an approach is consistently adopted, agency is prone to being
abused as a short-cut to attract privilege (since "anticipation oflitigation" is not
a requirement for solicitor-client privilege based on agency) . This potential
hazard is highlighted by the recent case of General Accident Assurance Co . v .
Cln'usz . 162 The plaintiff insurer in that case claimed privilege over
communications between the claims adjuster it hired to investigate a suspected
arson and the lawyer it retained. Despite the initial suspicion ofarson, $100,000
was paid on the defendant's claim forloss within two months ofthe fire. Another
three months later, the plaintiff agreed to pay a further $505,000 . Six months
after the fire, following receipt of a statement from a former employee of the
defendant, the insurer commenced litigation to recover the proceeds advanced.
At first instance Kurisko J. held that the adjuster's reports were third party
communications which would attract privilege (i.e. litigation privilege) only if
made for the dominant purpose of litigation. When initially made the reports
were so privileged. However, Kurisko J. decided that any anticipation of
litigation ceased when the insurer abandoned its positionthatthe fire was caused
by arson andpaid the claim ; consequently the reports ceased to be privileged on
the theory that litigation privilege ceases when the litigation ends. The present
161 Canadian cases holding
accountants to be their client's "agents" in various
contexts, and their communications with solicitors privileged onthat basis, have notalways
adhered to this "strict approach". While it is understandable that accountant-solicitor
communications may be necessitated by the client's lack of proficiency in accounting or
tax matters, and accountants may quite legitimately be acting as "agents" in transmitting
technical data to solicitors on behalf of the client for legal advice, some ofthe cases have
arguably gone beyond this reasonable scope in their findings of agency . For example, in
Susan Hosiery, supra note 14, the accountant who was held to be an "agent" was likely not
merely a conduit for information passing between the client and solicitors, but was also
actively engaged in setting up the tax arrangement and exercising his professional
expertise .Itissubmittedthatthe accountant'srolein Susan Hosiery might more appropriately
be construed as that of a "third party", rather than an "agent" . In considering this issue we
need to keep in mind that Canadian law has not conferred a separate privilege on
accountant-client communications . For other cases holding that communications through
agents are privileged, see Sopinka et al., supra note 67 at 650 .
162 (1998), 37 O.R. (3d)
790 (Div . Ct.), rev'g (1997), 12 C.P.C. (4th) 150 (Ont. Gen.
Div .) [hereinafter General Accident] (the Divisional Court held that communications
between a lawyer and a claims adjuster, acting as the plaintiff insurer's agent, were
protected by solicitor-client privilege; thus reversing Kurisko J.'s decision that the claims
adjuster was anindependent contractor and that no litigation privilege attached, because the
third party communications were not made for the dominant purpose of litigation).
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proceedings (commenced after the statement from the defendant's employee
was received) were new litigation; since the earlier communications from the
adjuster were not made in anticipation of this new litigation, they were not
privileged . In its decision the Divisional Court reversed Kurisko J.'s judgment
and held, alarmingly, that the communications were privileged because the
adjuster was "an agent ofthe insurer in the obtaining oflegal advice" . 163 In our
view the Divisional Court's finding of agency is decidedly wrong and most
regrettable . Insurance adjusters' reports, being third party communications,
have hitherto been subject only to litigation privilege and only if prepared for
the dominant purpose of litigation. Without even considering the implications,
the Divisional Court in General Accident flung the door open for third party
communications to benefit from the protection of solicitor-client privilege, by
the simple act of the client appointing the third party as an agent. 164
The Divisional Court's ruling may well have been prompted by its
dissatisfaction withthe outcome ofKurisko J.'s decision, which deniedprivilege
to documents almost certainly created with a view to litigation regarding this
very fire loss. The proper solution, however, would have been to challenge
Kurisko J.'s reasoning (i.e. by concluding that the possibility of litigation had
not ended with the plaintiff's payment on the defendant's claim for loss). 165 To
rectify the result at first instance by holding instead that the adjuster was an
agent, as the Divisional Court did, was unjustified and could have disastrous
consequences . Not only will this misguided ruling cause confusion among the
courts and text writers, but taken at face value, GeneralAccident mightprovide

General Accident (1998), ibid . at 795.
Infact, Kurisko J. in his judgmentatfirst instance, GeneralAccident (1997), supra
note 162 at 179, warned against this potential abuse: "Designating an independent
contractor as agent of an insurer for the purpose of obtaining the protection of legal
professional privilege would enable an insurer to gatherinformation in secrecy. This is the
scenario for trial by ambush" .
165 Alternatively, Kurisko J.'s decision might have been correct . He stated in his
judgment (ibid. at 180) that the current action "is based on fraudulent Proof of Loss. The
Statement of Claim does not even mention arson". Although Kurisko J. did not set out the
details of the plaintiff's allegations in this decision, the particulars were described in his
subsequent judgment on the plaintiff's motion to delay production, [1997] O.J. No. 4655
(Gen. Div .) (Q.L.):
For example, it is alleged that Chrusz and the Chrusz Employees moved undamaged
property after the fire, represented that such property had been damaged in the fire,
prepared false inventories of damaged property, inflated hourly rates for cleaning up,
inflated the replacement cost ofproperty damaged in the fire, inflated the number of
hours worked by employees . It is alleged Chrusz included each ofthese items in the
Proof of Loss (ibid. at para 30).
Giventhatarson is unrelated tothe alleged fraud, and that arsonwas (presumably) the basis
of litigation anticipated by the plaintiff insurer when the adjuster's reports were prepared,
it does not seem unreasonable to deny the plaintiff's claim of privilege on the ground that
the adjuster's reports had not been prepared for the current litigation .
163

164
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another avenue for an unnecessary and unwise expansion of solicitor-client
privilege (i.e. by clients simply designating all third parties as agents) . 166
Conclusion
Underlying our critique ofWilson and the Divisional Court decision in General
Accident has been the same concern : that both will lead to an undue expansion
of solicitor-client privilege. Wilson's proposal does this by an outright redefinition of the scope of solicitor-client privilege, i.e. by broadening its scope
to include communications from third parties to lawyers, currently protected
only by litigation privilege in the litigious context . The General Accident
(Divisional Court) ruling represents a different means of achieving the same
result (extending solicitor-client privilege to third party communications), i.e.
by manipulating the definition of "agents".
Wilson's proposal for changes is motivated by his desire to correct what he
considers to be a "truncation of the fundamental right to solicitor-client
privilege". This perception, however, has been the combinedresult ofhis failure
to analyze the public interest, misinterpretation ofSolosky andDescoteaux, and
misunderstanding of the distinct purposes for solicitor-client privilege and
litigation privilege. Because of Wilson's misdiagnosis, he prescribes the wrong
cure . Wilson's call for re-defining the scope of solicitor-client privilege is not
only unwarranted, but also perilous . It defies common law authorities and
invites confusion as to the role of confidentiality . If taken as prescribed,
Wilson's medicine may prove to be fatal; this is so especially since our law of
privilege has no need for such strong medication to begin with. This criticism
also applies to the Divisional Court judgment in General Accident. Insofar as
it opens up the possibility, through the dubious appointment of "agents", of
conferring solicitor-client privilege on third party communications, General
Accident has set a dangerous precedent.
Our discussion underscores the importance, in the interests of truth-finding
and of limiting potential abuse, to strictly confine the scope of privilege within
the bounds of necessity . Related to this, and equally important, is the need to
clearly delineate the distinction between solicitor-client privilege andlitigation
privilege. As we have seen, the consequences of conflating the two (e.g.
confusing the requirement of confidentiality) are most undesirable . By tracing
the sources of confusion surrounding these two privileges, and criticizing
contemporary writings (judicial and academic) which have contributed to this
confusion, we hope to clear the pathfor future discourse on this subject. Clarity
ofexpression, likewise, favours a more explicit judicial acknowledgement that
litigation privilege is a "qualified privilege" . In our view, the "good cause"
166 However, it should be noted that the Divisional Court judgment in General
Accident, for all its shortcomings, never disputed the distinction between solicitor-client
privilege and litigation privilege, clearly recognized in the lower court ruling : see e.g.
General Accident (1997), supra note 162 at 171. The decision cannot, therefore, be cited
as supporting the changes in law proposed by Wilson .
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exception to litigation privilege should be recognized by the Canadian courts
more openly, since they do already exercise discretion to "qualify" litigation
privilege, albeit indirectly through manipulation of the "dominant purpose
test". No doubt, the law in this area will continue to develop; as it does so,
competing aspects of the public interest will continue to assert themselves .
Within the context of striking a reasonable balance between disclosure and
privilege, the guiding principle must be, asLord Edmund-Davies suggests, that
"[j]ustice is better served by candour than by suppression" . 167
ADDENDUM
We have had the benefit of reading a draft of Mr. Wilson's rejoinderto our
article. The rejoinder is not merely, as its title suggests, "in favour of solicitorclient privilege" . As we indicated in our article, what Wilson favours is an
unprecedented expansion of the privilege.
Following this exchange the competing positions are now more or less
clear. Wilson would like to see solicitor-client privilege extended to
communications between solicitors and third parties in non-litigious contexts .
We disagree - for the reasons put forward in our article.
We initially wrote inresponse toWilson's articlebecause we felt that in the
course ofmaking his argument he left a misleading impression : that there was
significant legal authority to support his position ; for example, (1) that in
Solosky 168 and Descoteaux 169 the Supreme Court of Canada was actually
supporting the position put forward by Wilson, (2) that on balance the case law
has made the distinctionbetween solicitor-clientprivilege andlitigationprivilege
unnecessary, etc. In short we were concerned that the courts might conclude,
based on Wilson's analysis, that legal authority actually justified the extension
he argues for. We hope that, ifnothing else, our article dispels this view . ®n this
issue ofwhat the authorities say, itis worth repeating whatwe said in ourarticle
(to which Wilson offers no response):
Moreover, andthis ismosttelling, forall his rhetoric Wilson doesnot cite asingle case
(and we know of none, certainly no modern ones) which contradicts the result in
Wheeler by extending privilege to third party communications beyond the litigious
context.
So the question then becomes one of policy -where should the courts go
on this issue? We fully agree that if a strong case can be made for changing the
present law, then it should be changed. (The debate betweenus may have been
more interesting and illuminating had it been restricted to a straight policy
debate and less concerned with what the case law suggests .) However, on this
question of the appropriate policy we believe Wilson has not made out a case .
Undoubtedly Wilson believes strongly that his proposed change is desirable,
167 Waugh, supra note
168 Supra note 19 .

169 Supra

note 20.

53 at 543 .
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but belief (even strongly held) is not a sound basis for profound changes in the
law. As we have already explained, in policy terms our major concern is that
such a privilege would too easily give lawyers the "new product line" of
confidentiality. Wilson suggests, in his response, that the courts could deal
"appropriately with abuses, including claims for solicitor-client privilege not
given for bona fide legal advice". We are not so optimistic. We agree that
privilege should be denied where the real purpose is not to seek legal advice,but
to cloak the third party communication with privilege. However, we doubt
courts can easily make such a determination. By what criteria are they to
conclude there is a lack of bona fides? Generally courts do not feel comfortable
prying into the circumstances or the content of communications for which
solicitor-client privilege is claimed. Given this fact, how does the court
undertake an enquiry as to whether the legal advice given on survey research
(using Wilson's example) commissioned by the client is "bona fide legal
advice"? If tobacco companies were to have the results of research on how to
market cigarettes to children sent directly to theirlawyers with a request that the
lawyers advise as to whether it would be legal for them to market in this way,
how can it be said this is not the obtaining of "bonafide legal advice"? We
believe it would be quite wrong to allow privilege to attach to such research
findings, but Wilson's proposal could lead to this very result . It would take us
to a slippery slope which we should continue to avoid.
We could respond in detail to Mr. Wilson's reply, since we take issue with
many of his comments and observations . However, so as not to strain the
readers' patience, we rest on our original submissions and make only the
following comments .
Despite the rhetoric of the three Australian cases cited by Wilson in his
rejoinder, 170 none of them supportan extension of privilege to communications
fr-oni thirdparties where litigation is not anticipated . Our dispute with Wilson
is not over the theoretical justification of solicitor-client privilege, the issue is
whether the scope of this privilege ought to be enlarged to cover third party
communications regardless of any litigation context. The common law in its
wisdom has decided against such an extension, and policy considerations
support that decision .
Wilson repeats the contention that "the clearimplication" of Solosky is that
"there is one privilege, whether in a litigious context or not" . 171 This statement
is, in our view, simply wrong. Wilson relies upon a passage from Solosky which
traces the development of solicitor-client privilege, and the ultimate extension
170 J.D . Wilson, "It's Elementary My Dear Watson : A Reply in Favour of SolicitorClient Privilege" 549, 552.Wilson's draft ascribes two quotations to O'Reilly v. State Bank
ofVictoria Commissioners (1983), 152 C.L .R. 1(Wilson, ibid. at notes 14 and 24), in fact,
thecitedpassages came fromBakerv .Campbell (1983),153 C.L.R . 52 (H.C . of Aust .) . The
other two Australian cases citedby Wilson are Attorney-General (NT) v. Maurice (1986),
161 C.L.R . 475 (H .C. of Aust.) and Waterford v. The Cornmonx,ealth ofAustralia (1987),
163 C.L .R. 54 (H .C . of Aust .) .
171 Wilson, ibid . at 553 .
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of the privilege to "any consultation for legal advice, whether litigious or
not" . 172 It is undisputed that solicitor-client privilege applies, regardless of any
litigation context, to every direct communication between client and solicitor
made in confidence for the purpose of legal advice . The Solosky quotation
acknowledges this fact, but it provides no support whatever for the contention
that "there is one privilege" . Wilson's proposal of a single all-embracing
privilege covering third party communications was not addressed by the
Supreme Courtof Canada in either Solosky orDescoteaux. Such communications
are todayprotected (if made with the dominant purpose of litigation) only by the
separate litigation privilege, notsolicitor-client privilege. In neitherSoloskynor
Descoteaux was thecourt concerned with communications from third parties, 173
consequently litigation privilege neverbecame an issue. Clearly, the courtcould
nothave changedthe law of privilege pertaining to thirdparty communications
when the issue did not even arise!

Finally, Wilson erroneously characterizes our position as one
"recommending further truncation of privilege" and "promoting the American
model in which privilegein litigation is illusory". 174 In ourarticle, we argue that
the court's application of the dominant purpose test does already "qualify
litigation privilege, where successful assertion of the privilege would lead to a
result perceived to be unjust". We are not, therefore, advocating "further
truncation", our pleading is merely that the discretion already being exercised
by the courts should be expressed more openly . One way to accomplish this is
to adopt the "good cause" exception articulated in the United States . Contrary
to Wilson, this practice does not"fritter away" anyprivilege otherwiseavailable;
rather, itprovides amoredisciplined approach whichrationalizes the "truncation"
we have seen thus far.

172 Solosky,

supra note 19 at 834.
None of the passages from Solosky cited by Wilson, supra note 170 at 553,
suggested theextension of solicitor-client privilege to third party communications ; they do
not, therefore, support Wilson's notion of an "all-embracing solicitor-client privilege" in
any way.
174 Wilson, supra note 170 at 558.
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